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Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions†
By Mariann Ollár and Antonio Penta*
Multiplicity of equilibria and the dependence on strong common 
knowledge assumptions are well-known problems in mechanism 
design. We address them by studying full implementation via 
transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents’ beliefs. We 
show that incentive-compatible transfers ensure uniqueness—and 
hence full implementation—if they induce sufficiently weak strategic 
externalities. We then design transfers for full implementation 
by using information on beliefs in order to weaken the strategic 
externalities of the baseline canonical transfers. Our results rely 
on minimal restrictions on agents’ beliefs, specifically on moments 
of the distribution of types, that arise naturally in applications.  (JEL D62, D82, D83)
The problem of multiplicity is a key concern for the design of real-world mech-
anisms and institutions. Unless all the solutions of a mechanism are consistent with 
the outcome which the designer wishes to implement, the designer may not confi-
dently assume that the proposed mechanism will perform well. This is a well-known 
criticism of the widespread partial implementation approach to mechanism design, 
which requires only that there exists one strategy profile consistent with the cho-
sen solution concept that guarantees desirable outcomes. The full implementation 
approach (cf. Maskin 1999) overcomes the problem of multiplicity, but in pursuit 
of greater generality, the existing literature has typically adopted rather compli-
cated mechanisms.1 Thus, while it addresses an important practical concern, the full 
implementation literature overall has provided limited insight into how real-world 
institutions could be designed to avoid the problem of multiplicity.
Another well-known limitation of the classical approach is its excessive reliance 
on common knowledge assumptions. This criticism, often referred to as the Wilson 
1 See Jackson (1992) for an influential criticism of the tail-chasing mechanisms typically used in this literature. 
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doctrine, has recently received considerable attention in the literature on robust 
implementation. It is fair to say, however, that the aims of the Wilson doctrine, “[… ] 
to conduct useful analyses of practical problems […]” (Wilson 1987, p. 34), are still 
far from being fulfilled. In our view, this is due to two main reasons. First, most of 
this literature has focused on environments in which the designer has no information 
about the agents’ beliefs.2 This extreme assumption represents a useful benchmark 
to address foundational questions, but significantly limits the possible applications 
of the theory to practical problems of mechanism design. Second, as far as full 
implementation is concerned, the literature has focused on characterization results 
which offer little insight on the properties that more realistic mechanisms should 
satisfy, in order to ensure full implementation. In this paper we address these points 
by pursuing a more pragmatic approach to full implementation, based on transfer 
schemes that only elicit agents’ payoff-relevant information, and relying on more 
realistic assumptions of common knowledge, intermediate between the classical and 
the belief-free approaches.
For the sake of illustration, consider the problem of efficient implementation. In 
environments with single-crossing preferences, the generalized VCG transfers of 
Crémer and McLean (1985) guarantee partial implementation of the efficient alloca-
tion in an ex post equilibrium, with essentially no restrictions on the strength of the 
preference interdependence. Hence, independent of the agents’ beliefs, truthful rev-
elation (hence efficiency) is always achievable as part of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
(Bergemann and Morris 2005). The problem with this mechanism is that it typically 
admits also inefficient equilibria, which can be ruled out if and only if the interde-
pendence in agents’ valuations is not too strong (Bergemann and Morris 2009a). 
But since in many cases preference interdependence is strong, this characterization 
is often regarded as a negative result.
In this paper we shift the focus of the analysis from preference interdependence 
to the strategic externalities in the mechanism, which—unlike preferences—can be 
affected by the designer. The problem with the VCG transfers, for instance, is that 
when agents’ preferences exhibit strong interdependence, the strategic externalities 
in the mechanism are strong, in that agents’ best responses are strongly affected by 
others’ strategies. This in turn generates multiplicity of equilibria, and hence failure 
of full implementation. But if the designer has some information about the agents’ 
beliefs, then preferences and strategic externalities need not be aligned; the strategic 
externalities can be weakened, so as to ensure uniqueness, even if preference inter-
dependence is strong. To ensure that the unique solution implements the designer’s 
objective, the strategic externalities should be weakened in a way that preserves 
incentive compatibility—if not in the ex post sense, then at least for the beliefs 
consistent with the designer’s information. Note that this argument also suggests a 
tension between the robustness of the partial implementation result (achieved by 
the VCG mechanism in an ex post equilibrium) and the possibility of achieving 
full implementation (which, if preference interdependence is strong, necessarily 
requires information about beliefs).
2 On the belief-free approach, see Bergemann and Morris (2005, 2009a, b, 2011) for static mechanisms and 
Müller (2016) and Penta (2015) for dynamic ones. We discuss the related literature in Section V. 
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Our model covers implementation problems with one-dimensional types, smooth 
allocation rules, and smooth valuation functions under varying assumptions on 
agents’ beliefs. For this reason, we adopt a solution concept which extends ratio-
nalizability to environments with incomplete information and general assumptions 
on beliefs.3 The resulting notion of implementation provides a unified framework to 
study full implementation under a broad class of belief restrictions, thereby allowing 
for varying degrees of robustness. It also formalizes the idea that the robustness of a 
mechanism is determined contextually with its design, and as such it can be chosen 
by the designer the same way that transfers are. This change in perspective allows 
us to move beyond the existing characterization results, to gain insights on what can 
still be achieved when the conditions for belief-free implementation are not met.
The general analysis parallels the example above. First we derive the canonical 
transfers, a generalization of well-known necessary conditions for ex post incen-
tive-compatible payment schemes. Depending on the environment, and particu-
larly on the strength of the preference interdependence, the canonical transfers may 
induce overly strong strategic externalities, which are problematic for full imple-
mentation. The second part of our design then exploits the belief restrictions to 
reduce the strategic externalities, so as to induce uniqueness. The conditions that 
guarantee full implementation relate the strength of the preference interdependence 
to the designer’s information on agents’ beliefs. This information takes the form of 
moment conditions, which represent weak restrictions on agents’ beliefs and which 
arise naturally in applications.
Our results suggest a simple design strategy: start with the canonical transfers, 
and then compensate each agent for the strategic externality he faces, given every-
body’s reports. To deter agents from misreporting their types in order to inflate their 
compensation, each agent  i is also asked to pay a fee equal to the expected cumula-
tive marginal compensation, given his report:
  t i (m) =   t i ∗ (m)   ⏟ canonical transfers  (e.g., VCG) 
 +   CS E i ( m i ,  m −i )  
 
compensation for 
  strategic externality   
(depends on everybody’s report)
 
 −   ∫   m i  E ( ∂ CS E i ______∂ m i  |  s i ) d  s i  
 
belief-based adjustment: cumulative 
    expected marginal compensation    
(only depends on i’s report)
 
 . 
The first term we add to the canonical transfers reduces the strategic externalities 
and ensures uniqueness; the last term, derived from the designer’s information about 
beliefs, restores incentive compatibility. Full implementation follows.
As applications of our main results, we study smooth environments that satisfy 
standard single-crossing properties and a public concavity condition, which gen-
eralizes important classes of models in the literature. Under these restrictions on 
preferences, we show that: (i) in the Bayesian environments that are common in the 
classical and applied literature, full implementation via transfers is always possible 
if types are independent, or if they are affiliated and valuations are supermodular, 
3 Formally, our solution concept is a special case of Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s (2003)  Δ -Rationalizability and 
encompasses several notions such as belief-free (Bergemann and Morris 2009a) and interim correlated rationaliz-
ability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris 2007). Further connections are discussed in Sections II and V. 
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regardless of preference interdependence; (ii) within these settings, ex post  incentive 
compatibility is possible if and only if (interim) dominant-strategy implementation 
is; (iii) in non-Bayesian environments, in which only the conditional averages of 
types are common knowledge, implementation can always be achieved, provided 
that the conditional averages of the opponents’ types are constant or increasing in 
an agent’s own type.
Finally, we show that mechanisms with weak strategic externalities have further 
desirable properties, such as low sensitivity to misspecifications of agents’ beliefs. 
This result suggests further notions of robustness as well as a novel concept of 
approximate implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model and 
the leading examples. Section II presents the notion of implementation. Section III 
provides the main results on full implementation via transfers. Section IV contains 
the applications and the sensitivity analysis. The related literature is discussed in 
Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. Model
Environments and Mechanisms.—We consider environments with transferable 
utility with a finite set of agents  I =  {1,  … , n} , in which the space of allocations 
X is a compact and convex subset of a Euclidean space. Agents privately observe 
their payoff types  θ i ∈  Θ i ≔ [  θ _ i ,  _ θi ] ⊆ 핉 , and we adopt the standard nota-
tion  θ −i ∈  Θ −i =  × j≠i  Θ j and  θ ∈ Θ =  × i∈I  Θ i for profiles. Agent  i ’s valuation 
function is  v i : X × Θ → 핉 , assumed three times continuously differentiable, and 
we let  t i ∈ 핉 denote the private transfer to agent  i : for each outcome  (x, θ,  ( t i ) i∈I ) , 
 i ’s utility is equal to  v i (x, θ) +  t i . The tuple  ⟨I,  ( Θ i ,  v i ) i∈I ⟩ is common knowledge 
among the agents. If  v i is constant in  θ −i for every  i , then the environment has private 
values. If not, it has interdependent values.
An allocation rule is a mapping  d : Θ → X which assigns to each payoff state 
the allocation that the designer wishes to implement. We focus on allocation rules 
that are twice continuously differentiable and responsive, in the sense that for 
all  i and  θ i ≠  θ i ′, there exists  θ −i ∈  Θ −i such that  d ( θ i ,  θ −i ) ≠ d ( θ i ′ ,  θ −i ) (e.g., 
Bergemann and Morris 2009a).
The model accommodates general externalities in consumption, including both 
pure cases of private and public divisible goods. The main substantive restric-
tions are the one-dimensionality of types and the smoothness of the allocation 
function, which for instance rules out standard auction applications. We will use 
the notation  ∂ f/∂ x for all derivatives, with the understanding that when  X is mul-
tidimensional,  
∂ v i  ___∂ x(x, θ) and  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) denote the vectors of partial derivatives and 
 
∂ v i  ___∂ x(x, θ) ·   ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) denotes their inner product.
We consider direct mechanisms, in which agents report their type and the 
allocation is chosen according to  d . A direct mechanism is thus uniquely deter-
mined by a transfer scheme  t =  ( t i ) i∈I ,  t i : Θ → 핉 , which specifies the trans-
fer to each agent  i , for all profiles of reports  m ∈ Θ .4 (To distinguish the report 
4 The full implementation literature typically focuses on characterizations of the implementable  f : Θ → Y , 
where  Y denotes the space of outcomes (see, e.g., Bergemann and Morris 2009a). For  Y = X ×  핉 n , such 
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from the state, we maintain the notation  m i even though the message spaces 
are  M i =  Θ i .) We focus on transfer schemes that are twice continuously differ-
entiable and bounded. Thus, under the maintained assumptions, a transfer scheme 
induces a game with ex post payoff functions  U i (m; θ) =  v i (d(m), θ) +  t i (m) 
that are twice continuously differentiable and bounded.5 For every  θ i ∈  Θ i ,  μ ∈ Δ ( M −i ×  Θ −i ) , and  m i ∈  M i , we let  E U  θ i  μ( m i ) =  ∫  M −i × Θ −i   U i( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) dμ 
denote agent  i ’s expected payoff from message  m i , if  i ’s type is  θ i and his conjectures 
are  μ , and define  B R  θ i  (μ) ≔ arg  max  m i ∈ M i  E U  θ i  μ( m i ) .
Belief Restrictions.—We model belief restrictions as sets of possible beliefs for 
each type of every agent. Formally, the belief restrictions are a commonly known 
collection   =  (( B  θ i  )  θ i ∈ Θ i  ) i∈I such that  B  θ i  ⊆ Δ ( Θ −i ) is nonempty and convex 
for all  i and  θ i , and  B i :  θ i ↦  B  θ i  ⊆ Δ ( Θ −i ) is continuous for every  i . If  and  ′ 
are such that  B  θ i  ⊆  B  θ i  ′ for all  θ i and  i , we write   ⊆ ′ .
This formulation is fairly general. For instance, if  B  θ i  is a singleton for every  θ i 
and  i , then we obtain a standard Bayesian environment, in which agents’ hierar-
chies of beliefs are uniquely pinned down by their payoff types. The further special 
case of a common prior model requires that  B  θ i  =  { b  θ i  } are such that there exists 
 p ∈ Δ (Θ) such that  b  θ i  = p ( · |  θ i ) ∈ Δ ( Θ −i ) for each  i and  θ i . If, furthermore, 
 B  θ i   =  B  θ i ′ for all  i and all  θ i ,  θ i ′ ∈  Θ i , then we obtain the case of independent 
types (cf. Example 1). At the opposite extreme, if  B  θ i  = Δ ( Θ −i ) for all  θ i and  i , 
then there are essentially no restrictions on beliefs (beyond their support, that is), 
and the model coincides with the belief-free environments that are common in the 
literature on robust mechanism design (see footnote 2). Such vacuous restrictions 
are thus denoted by   BF . Our model also accommodates settings, intermediate 
between the Bayesian and belief-free cases, in which some restrictions on beliefs 
are maintained but not to the point that belief hierarchies are uniquely determined 
by the payoff types. In those cases,  represents the designer’s partial information 
about agents’ beliefs. If   ⊆ ′ , then  ′ entails weaker restrictions than   .
A. Leading Examples
Example 1 (Full Implementation in a Common Prior Model): Consider an 
environment with two agents,  i ∈ {1, 2} . The social planner chooses a quantity 
x ∈ X ⊆  핉 + of a public good, with cost of production  c (x) =  1 _2  x 2 . Agents’ val-
uation functions are  v i (x, θ) =  ( θ i + γ θ j ) x , where  γ ≥ 0 is a parameter of pref-
erence interdependence: if  γ = 0 , this is a private-value setting; if  γ > 0 , values 
are interdependent. The planner knows that types are i.i.d. draws from a uniform 
 characterization results can be used to check whether a given  f  ( · ) =  (d ( · ) , t ( · ) ) is implementable by a direct 
mechanism (and hence whether a given transfer scheme implements  d ), but do not provide insights on how to 
design transfers for full implementation. Since we are interested in this kind of constructive insights, we maintain 
here the standard setup of the partial implementation literature: that is, we only take  d : Θ → X as given, and let 
the designer choose  t : Θ →  핉 n . The restriction to direct mechanisms also entails some loss of generality for full 
implementation, but in these environments it allows an easier comparison with the partial implementation literature, 
by making transparent what features of an incentive-compatible transfer scheme may or may not be problematic 
for full implementation. 
5 Since  (d, t) will be clear from the context, we don’t emphasize the dependence of the payoff functions on  (d, t) . 
Also, for any measurable set  E , we let  Δ (E ) denote the set of probability measures on its Borel sigma-algebra. 
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distribution over  Θ i ≡  [0, 1] , denoted by  υ –  Θ i  , and that this is common knowledge 
among the agents. This is a standard common prior environment, with independently 
distributed types and interdependent values. The planner’s information about 
agents’ beliefs is represented by belief restrictions   =  (( B  θ i   )  θ i ∈ Θ i  ) i∈I such that  B  θ i  = { υ –  Θ j  } for every  i ,  j ≠ i , and  θ i ∈  Θ i .
The social planner wishes to implement the efficient level of public good, 
 d (θ) =  (1 + γ)  ( θ 1 +  θ 2 ) . This allocation rule can be partially implemented by the 
generalized VCG transfers
(1)  t i VCG (m) = − (1 + γ)  ( 1 _2  m i 2 + γ  m i  m j ) . 
Given this, for any pair  ( m j ,  θ j ) of  j ’s report and type, the ex post best-reply for 
type  θ i is
(2)  B R  θ i  VCG ( m j ,  θ j ) = pro j  [0, 1]  ( θ i + γ ( θ j −  m j ) ) . 6
Observe that, for any  γ ≥ 0 , truthful revelation ( m i ( θ i ) =  θ i ) is a best response 
to the opponent’s truthful strategy ( m j  ( θ j ) =  θ j ), and hence the efficient allocation 
rule is partially implemented independent of agents’ beliefs. Furthermore, if  γ < 1 , 
equation (2) is a contraction, and its iteration delivers truthful revelation as the only 
rationalizable strategy. In this case, the VCG mechanism also guarantees belief-free 
full implementation (Bergemann and Morris 2009a). But full implementation fails 
if  γ ≥ 1 . (In the symmetric case with  n agents, it can be shown that no mechanism 
achieves belief-free full implementation if  γ ≥ 1/ (n − 1) .)
Hence, with weak interdependence in valuations, the designer need not rely 
on the common prior: the VCG mechanism ensures full implementation in the 
belief-free model   BF ⊃  . If the interdependence is strong, however, full 
implementation fails, even under the   -restrictions. For instance, if  γ = 2 
and types are independently and uniformly distributed, the strategy profile 
 ( m ˆ 1 ( θ 1 ) = 1,  m ˆ 2 ( θ 2 ) = 0) is also a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this mechanism, 
and it is inefficient.
Being designed to achieve ex post incentive compatibility, the VCG mecha-
nism ignores any information about agents’ beliefs. We propose next a different 
set of transfers, which do exploit some information contained in the common prior 
(namely, that  E ( θ j |  θ i ) = 0.5 for all  θ i and  i ):
(3)  t i ρ (m) ≔ − (1  +  γ) ( 1 __2  m i 2  +  γ  m i E ( θ j |  θ i ) ) = − (1  +  γ)  ( 1 __2  m i 2  +  γ  m i  ·  0.5) . 
These transfers induce the following best response function:
(4)  B R  θ i  ρ( m ˆ j ( · ) ) = pro j  [0, 1]  ( θ i + γ [E ( θ j |  θ i ) − 0.5] ) . 
Since, under the common prior,  E (θ j |  θ i ) = 0.5 for all  θ i , the term in square brackets 
cancels out for all types. Truthful revelation therefore is strictly  dominant, regardless 
6 For any  y ∈ 핉 ,  pro j  [0, 1]  (y) ≔ arg  min  m i ∈ [0, 1]   |  m i − y | denotes the projection of  y on the interval  [0, 1] . 
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of the strength of preference interdependence,  γ . Note that this holds for all beliefs 
that satisfy the moment condition  E ( θ j |  θ i ) = 0.5 for all  θ i . Hence, full implemen-
tation is guaranteed not just for the common prior model,   , but also for the weaker 
restrictions   ˆ = ( ( B ˆ θ i   )  θ i ∈ Θ i  ) i∈I defined as  B ˆ θ i  ≔ { b i ∈ Δ ( Θ j ) :  ∫    θ j · d b i = 0.5} . 
Moreover, since truthful revelation is dominant in this mechanism, given   ˆ , 
such restrictions need not be common knowledge among the agents: as long as 
E ( θ j |  θ i ) = 0.5 for all  θ i , full implementation obtains independent of higher-order 
beliefs.  
The previous example poses a standard Bayesian implementation problem, in 
which the planner’s information is represented by a common prior model,   . Full 
implementation, however, need not rely on the full strength of these assumptions. If 
0 ≤ γ < 1 , the VCG mechanism ensures belief-free implementation, that is for all 
beliefs consistent with   BF ⊃  . If  γ ≥ 1 , the transfers in (3) achieve full imple-
mentation for all beliefs consistent with   ˆ ⊃  . Clearly, the precise definition of 
 ˆ depends on the particular moment condition we used to design the transfers. Had 
we used a different condition, full implementation might have obtained for different 
belief restrictions  ′ ⊃  . Thus, it is not only true that   , which represents the 
designer’s information, need not coincide with the set of beliefs for which imple-
mentation is ensured (such as   BF or   ˆ in the example), but the latter set is itself 
determined by the planner’s choice of the mechanism.
In Section II we introduce the notion of implementation, and formalize the sense 
in which the strength of the strategic externalities, not of the preference interde-
pendence, is key for full implementation. The two go hand in hand in belief-free 
environments, but need not coincide if the designer has some information about 
agents’ beliefs. In Section III we develop a design principle which consists of using 
properly chosen belief restrictions to weaken the strategic externalities of a base-
line canonical mechanism. We show that moment conditions, formally introduced in 
Section IB, are particularly suited to this task.
In the example above, a moment condition enabled us to completely offset the 
strategic externalities of the VCG mechanism, thereby ensuring full implementation 
in dominant strategies. In the general case in which strategic externalities cannot 
be completely eliminated, our design strategy pursues contractive best replies, to 
ensure that truthful revelation is the unique rationalizable outcome. The next exam-
ple illustrates this point in a non-Bayesian model.
Example 2 (Full Implementation without a Common Prior): Consider an 
environment with three agents,  i ∈ { 1, 2, 3} , who commonly believe that types  θ i ∈  [0, 1] are i.i.d. draws from some distribution  Φ . The distribution itself, however, 
is not necessarily known by the agents, and most importantly it is unknown to the 
designer. This environment therefore provides an example both of non-Bayesian 
belief restrictions and of a situation in which the designer may know less than what 
is commonly known by the agents.
Preferences are such that  v i (x, θ) =  ( θ i + γ  θ j + δ θ k ) x for each  i , where 
x ∈  핉 + denotes the quantity of public good,  γ, δ ∈ 핉 , and where we let  j ≔ i + 1 (mod 3) and  k ≔ i + 2 (mod 3) . If the cost of production is the same as in the 
 previous example, the efficient allocation rule is  d (θ) = κ ( θ 1 +  θ 2 +  θ 3 ) where 
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 κ  ≡   (1 + γ + δ) . The VCG transfers are  t i VCG (m)   =  −κ(0.5 m i 2 +  m i  (γ m  j + δ m k )) , which induce the following interim best reply:
  B R  θ i  VCG = pro j  [0, 1]  ( θ i + E (γ ( θ j −  m j ) + δ ( θ k −  m k ) |  θ i ) ) . 
Now, suppose that  γ = 4/3 and  δ = −2/3 . With these parameter values, any 
report profile is rationalizable, and belief-free implementation fails. The following 
transfers instead achieve full implementation:  t i ρ (m) =  t i VCG (m) +  m i κγ ( m j −  m k ) . 
With these transfers, the best reply is
(5)  B R  θ i  ρ  = pro j  [0, 1]  ( θ i + γE ( θ j −  θ k |  θ i ) +  (γ + δ) E ( θ k −  m k |  θ i ) ) 
 = pro j  [0, 1]  ( θ i +  (γ + δ) E ( θ k −  m k |  θ i ) ) . 
The simplification in the second line occurs because, regardless of the distribution 
Φ , we have that  E ( θ j −  θ k |  θ i ) = 0 in this model. Unlike the previous example, stra-
tegic externalities are not eliminated in this case. However, for the values of param-
eters specified above, the term  (γ + δ) = 2 / 3 < 1 . Hence, the best replies induce 
a contraction, which delivers truthful revelation as the only rationalizable profile. 
Similar to the previous example, full implementation only relies on common knowl-
edge of the moment condition  E ( θ j −  θ k |  θ i ) = 0 for all  θ i . Formally, the belief 
restrictions   in this model are such that  B  θ i  =  { b i ∈ Δ ( Θ −i ) : ∃ ϕ ∈ Δ([0, 1]) 
such that  b  i =  ⊗ j≠i ϕ} , whereas transfers  t ρ achieve full implementation for the 
weaker restrictions  ′ ⊇  , such that  B  θ i  ′ = { b i ∈ Δ ( Θ −i ) :  ∫    ( θ k −  θ j ) d  b i = 0} , 
whenever  |γ + δ| < 1. 
B. Moment Conditions
As shown above, our design strategy exploits a special class of belief restrictions: 
moment conditions. In this section we introduce the concept formally.
DEFINITION 1: A   -consistent moment condition is a collection  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i) i∈I of 
twice continuously differentiable functions,  L i :  Θ −i → 핉 and  f i :  Θ i → 핉 , such 
that given  it is common knowledge that  i ’s expectation of  L  i ( θ −i ) varies with  θ i 
according to  f i . We let  ϱ () denote the set of moment conditions that are consistent 
with . Formally,  ( L i,  f i  ) i∈I ∈ ϱ () if and only if
(6)  ∫  Θ −i  
 
  L  i ( θ −i ) d  b i =  f i( θ i )  for all i,  θ i , and  b i ∈  B  θ i  . 
For each -consistent moment condition,  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i ) i∈I ∈ ϱ () , we define 
the belief restrictions in which only common knowledge of  ρ is maintained, 
as   ρ =  (( B  θ i  ρ  )  θ i ∈ Θ i  ) i∈I such that
  B  θ i  ρ ≔  { b i ∈ Δ ( Θ −i ) :  ∫  Θ −i  
 
  L  i ( θ −i ) d  b i =  f i( θ i ) }  for all i and  θ i . 
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It is easy to see that, for any   and  ρ ∈ ϱ () ,   ρ entails weaker restrictions 
than  (that is,   ρ ⊇  ). The next two examples show how moment conditions are 
implicit in standard models.
Example 3 (Unobserved Heterogeneity and Fundamental Value Models): 
Suppose that types  θ i are i.i.d. draws from a distribution  F η , where  η is drawn 
from another distribution  H and is unobserved by the designer. This model entails 
many moment conditions. For instance, it is common knowledge in this model 
that  E ( θ l −  θ k |  θ i ) = 0 for all  θ i and  i ≠ l, k . This is represented by setting 
 L  i ( θ −i ) =  θ l −  θ k for some  l, k ≠ i and  f i( θ i ) = 0 for all  θ i . (This moment condi-
tion was used in Example 2.) Notice that this is the case regardless of the details of 
the distributions  H and  F η , and on whether  η is observed by the agents. Examples 
of the first case include models of unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Aradillas-López, 
Gandhi, and Quint 2013). Examples of the second case are provided by fundamental 
value models, in which  θ i =  θ 0 +  ε i , where  ε i s are i.i.d. across agents and inde-
pendent of  θ 0 , which in turn is drawn from a normal distribution but remains unob-
served (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Hellwig 1980).  
Example 4 (Spatial Values): Consider an environment with two groups of 
agents (e.g., distinct by geographic location, technology, etc.). Agents are assigned 
to group 1 independently with probability  p , and they inherit the type of their 
group, drawn independently from a distribution with mean  E (θ) . An agent’s type 
is his private information, his group is known to the designer but not to the other 
agents (e.g., Ausubel and Baranov 2013). In this model it is common knowledge 
that  E ( θ j |  θ i ) = p (i)  θ i +  (1 − p (i) ) E (θ) , where  p (i) = p if  i belongs to 
group  1 , and  (1 − p) otherwise. The corresponding moment condition obtains 
setting  L  i ( θ −i ) =  θ j for some  j ≠ i and  f i( θ i ) = p (i)  θ i +  (1 − p (i) ) E (θ) .  
Moment conditions arise naturally in many settings, in which knowledge of some 
moments of the distribution is a more basic and realistic kind of information than the 
one implicit in standard common prior models. Consider the following examples.
Example 5 (Uncorrelated Types without a Prior): Suppose that the designer has 
data showing no significant correlations across agents. His information, however, 
does not include the entire distribution of agents’ types, but only some moments  ρ 
of that distribution. In this case, the designer’s information itself consists of moment 
conditions (that is,   =   ρ ). For example, if types are uncorrelated, for each 
 i ,  j , and  θ i , we have  E ( θ j |  θ i ) =  y j for some  y j ∈ 핉 . In this case, a moment condi-
tion obtains by letting  L  i ( θ −i ) =  θ j and  f i( θ i ) =  y j .  
Example 6 (Estimation-Based Conditions): Consider a situation in which past 
data facilitate conditional predictions of agents’ types in the form of linear regres-
sions. Linear regressions are moment conditions, with  L  i ( θ −i ) =  θ j for  j ≠ i and 
 f i( θ i ) =  c ˆi +  a ˆi  θ i (where  a ˆi and  c ˆi are the estimated coefficients). Alternatively, past 
data may only report aggregate statistics of the distributions, so that only  conditional 
expectations of the average of types may be available. In this case, a moment 
 condition is obtained by letting  L  i ( θ −i ) =  1 ___ n − 1  ∑ j≠i    θ j , and so on. 
2252 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AUGUST 2017
Econometric methods often provide a description of the environment in terms 
of conditional moments of the distributions, rather than a single common prior. In 
these cases, the very belief-restrictions   can be specified as the set of all beliefs 
consistent with such moment conditions, taken as a primitive. Examples 5 and 6 are 
instances of such situations.
Observe that, in general, any belief restriction entails common knowledge of some 
moment conditions (that is,  ϱ () ≠ ∅ for any ). At a minimum, condition (6) is sat-
isfied for any constant functions  L 
–
i ( · ) =  f – i ( · ) =  y –. In a belief-free environment, 
only such trivial moment conditions are commonly known. (Conversely,   ρ ≡   BF 
whenever  ρ =  ( L –i ,  f – i ) i∈I consists of such trivial moment conditions.) In general, 
the stronger the belief-restrictions (i.e., the smaller the sets ), the richer the set 
of moment conditions:  ϱ (′) ⊆ ϱ () if   ⊆ ′ . Hence, common prior models 
are maximal in the set of moment conditions they satisfy: if   is a common prior 
model, any collection of functions  L  i :  Θ −i → 핉 satisfies  ( L  i ,  f i L ) i∈I ∈ ϱ () for 
 f i  L ( θ i ) ≔  ∫  Θ −i   L  i ( θ −i ) dp (· |  θ i ) , and hence the designer has maximum freedom to 
choose a suitable moment condition (cf. Section IV).
II. Implementation
Our solution concept,   -rationalizability, is defined by an iterated deletion pro-
cedure in which, for each type  θ i , a report survives the  k th round of deletion if and 
only if it can be justified by conjectures (i.e., joint beliefs over the opponents’ types 
and their behavior in the mechanism) that are consistent with the belief restrictions 
for that type, and with the previous rounds of deletion. For every  i and  θ i , the set 
of conjectures that are consistent with the belief restrictions for type  θ i is defined 
as  C  θ i  
 ≔  { μ i ∈ Δ( M −i ×  Θ −i ) :  marg  Θ −i   μ i ∈  B  θ i  } .
DEFINITION 2 (-Rationalizability): Fix a direct mechanism and belief restric-
tions . For every  i ∈ I , let  R i , 0 =  Θ i ×  M i and for each  k = 1, 2,  … , let
  R −i , k−1 =  × j≠i  R j , k−1 , 
  R i , k =  { ( θ i ,  m i ) :  m i ∈ B R  θ i  ( μ i )  for some  μ i ∈  C  θ i   ∩ Δ ( R −i , k−1 ) } , 
and  R i  =  ∩ k≥0  R i , k .7 The set of -rationalizable messages for type  θ i is
  R i  ( θ i ) ≔  { m i :  ( θ i ,  m i ) ∈  R i  } . 
DEFINITION 3 (Full Implementation): Allocation rule  d is   -implemented by trans-
fer scheme  t =  ( t i ) i∈I , if truthful revelation is the only -rationalizable  strategy 
 profile in the direct mechanism  (d, t) (that is, if  R i  ( θ i ) =  { θ i } for all  i and  θ i ).8 If 
7   -rationalizability is a special case of Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s (2003)  Δ -rationalizability, obtained by 
setting their  Δ -restrictions such that  Δ  θ i  =  C  θ i   for all  θ i . Under the maintained assumptions of Section II, the 
sets  R i , k−1 are measurable and well defined for the mechanisms we consider, for every  k . 
8 A weaker notion of implementation would allow nontruthful reports, provided that they all induce the same 
allocation as the true type profile (i.e.,  R  (θ) ≠ ∅ , and  d (m) = d (θ) for all  m ∈  R  (θ) ). But it can be shown that 
the two notions coincide for responsive allocation rules. 
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this occurs in only one round of deletion (i.e., if  R i ,1 ( θ i ) =  { θ i } for all  i and  θ i ), then 
we say that  t implements  d in -dominant strategies.
We say that  d is -implementable (respectively,   -DS implementable) if there exist 
transfers that   -implement  d (respectively, implement  d in   -dominant strategies).
As the belief restrictions are varied,   -rationalizability coincides with various 
versions of rationalizability, some of which play an important role in the literature 
on robustness and implementation (see Section V). Also note that   -rationalizability 
is a weak solution concept, and full implementation results are stronger if obtained 
with respect to a weaker solution concept. Hence, sufficient conditions for full 
  -implementation guarantee full implementation with respect to any (nonempty) 
refinement of   -rationalizability. Finally, it can be shown that   -rationalizability 
characterizes the set of all Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies, taking the union over 
all type spaces that are consistent with . Full   -implementation therefore can be 
seen as a shortcut to analyze standard questions of Bayesian implementation for 
general belief restrictions.
Note that   -DS implementation is more demanding and more robust than 
  -implementation. As shown in Example 1, if truthful implementation is achieved in 
one round of   -rationalizability, then truthful revelation is the only best response to 
all conjectures consistent with . In this case, full implementation obtains indepen-
dent of higher-order beliefs, so the belief restrictions need not be common knowl-
edge among the agents.
It is immediate from Definition 3 that, in order to achieve -implementation, the 
truthful profile must be a mutual best response for every type and for all conjectures 
consistent with the belief restrictions. This suggests the following notion of incen-
tive compatibility.
DEFINITION 4: A direct mechanism is strictly   -incentive compatible (  -IC) if, 
for every agent and every type, truthful revelation is a strict best response to all 
conjectures that are consistent with the belief restrictions and concentrated on the 
opponents’ truthful profile. Formally, if  B R  θ i  (μ) =  { θ i } for all  i ∈ I ,  θ i ∈  Θ i , and 
for all  μ ∈  C  θ i   such that  μ ( { ( θ −i ,  m −i ) :  m −i =  θ −i } ) = 1 .
It is easy to verify that strict   -IC coincides with strict ex post incentive compat-
ibility (EPIC) if   =   BF , and with strict interim (or Bayesian) incentive compat-
ibility if  is a standard type space. The following results are straightforward, from 
Definitions 3 and 4.
Remark 1: (i) Strict -IC is a necessary condition for   -implementation. (ii) If a 
direct mechanism is strictly  ′ -IC, then it is strictly -IC for all stronger restrictions 
 ⊆ ′ . (iii) If  d is  ′ -implementable, then it is -implementable for all stronger 
restrictions   ⊆ ′ .
The last point formalizes the idea, discussed in Section IA, that achieving imple-
mentation with respect to   (the beliefs consistent with the designer’s informa-
tion) is the minimum objective. The notion of implementation, however, implicitly 
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accounts for the possibility of achieving full implementation for weaker belief 
restrictions  ′ ⊇  , which would ensure a more robust result. In Example 1, for 
instance, depending on the parameter  γ , full implementation could be obtained with 
respect to   BF or   ˆ , both of which are weaker than the designer’s information in that 
example. Hence, if  d is   ρ -implementable for some  ρ ∈ ϱ () , -implementation 
is achieved in a more robust sense (that is, relying on weaker common knowledge 
assumptions, namely   ρ ⊇  ).
As usual, incentive compatibility does not suffice for full implementation. We 
provide next some sufficient conditions, which will inform the design of transfers 
in Section III.9
THEOREM 1: Let  (d, t) be strictly -incentive compatible, with twice con-
tinuously differentiable transfers  t i : M → 핉 and such that, for every 
i ∈ I ,  θ i ∈  Θ i , and  μ ∈  C  θ i   ,  E  U  θ i  μ :  M i → 핉 is strictly concave. Then,  (d, t) 
achieves full  -implementation if the following holds:
(  -Limited Strategic Externalities (-LSE)) for all  i and  θ i , for all  μ ∈  C  θ i   
and  m i ,  m i ′ ∈  M i ,
(7)  |  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
   ∂ 2  U i ____ ∂ 2  m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) dμ | 
   >  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∑ 
j≠i 
 |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) | dμ. 
To understand this result, consider the first-order condition of type  θ i ’s optimi-
zation problem, given conjectures  μ ∈  C  θ i   :  ∫  M −i × Θ −i   ∂ U i ___∂ m i ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) dμ = 0 . 
Under the concavity assumption in the theorem, this condition is both necessary 
and sufficient for an interior  m i ∗  to be a best response to  μ ∈  C  θ i   . Then, the sec-
ond derivative  
 ∂ 2  U i ______ ∂ m i ∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) measures the effect of  j ’s report on  i ’s best 
response, and hence  j ’s strategic externality on  i . Condition (7) requires the own 
effect to be stronger than the opponents’ effects, considered jointly. This condition 
therefore captures the idea that strategic externalities should not be too large.
Theorem 1 extends a result from Moulin (1984), which ensured uniqueness in 
nice games with complete information. The proof of Theorem 1, however, requires a 
different argument. This is partly due to the infinite-dimensional strategy spaces, but 
also to the robustness requirement implicit in the belief restrictions: unlike Moulin’s 
(1984) complete information case, the concavity and LSE conditions alone do not 
suffice for the uniqueness result. A case in point is provided by Section IVB, in 
which we show that mechanisms that satisfy both the concavity and LSE conditions, 
but fail   -incentive compatibility, may have multiple   -rationalizable outcomes.
9 In Ollár and Penta (2016), we provide a full characterization of -implementation. The characterization result, 
however, is not particularly suited to providing insights on the design of transfers for full implementation. Thus, 
rather than discussing the full characterization, we focus here on sufficient conditions which provide a clearer eco-
nomic intuition. None of the results in this paper rely on the characterization in Ollár and Penta (2016). 
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III. Designing Transfers for Full Implementation
Theorem 1 suggests that mechanisms with concave payoff functions and small 
strategic externalities may be useful to attain full implementation. In the following 
we exploit this insight to explicitly design transfers for full implementation.
We begin by considering belief-free implementation, which ensures the maxi-
mum level of robustness. In Section IIIA we introduce the canonical transfers and 
show that they characterize the mechanisms that achieve belief-free implementa-
tion. Hence, if the canonical transfers induce overly strong strategic externalities, 
belief-free implementation is impossible. Full implementation may still be possible 
if information about beliefs is used. In Section IIIB, we obtain transfers for full 
implementation adding a belief-based term to the canonical transfers. The extra term 
is derived from moment conditions chosen in order to ensure the concavity and the 
-LSE conditions. Full implementation then follows from Theorem 1.
A. Canonical Transfers and Belief-Free Implementation
Consider the following transfers: for each  i ∈ I and  m ∈ Θ , let
(8)  t i ∗ (m) = − v i (d (m) , m) +  ∫  θ _  i   m  i   ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d ( s i ,  m −i ) ,  s i ,  m −i ) d  s i . 
We will refer to  t ∗ =  ( t i ∗ ( · ) ) 
i∈I as the canonical transfers, and to the pair  (d,  t ∗ ) as 
the canonical direct mechanism. In the canonical direct mechanism, agents pay their 
valuation as entailed by the reports profile minus the total own preference effect. 
This way, agents’ payments coincide with the total allocation effect of their report, 
given the opponents’ messages.10
The canonical transfers generalize several known mechanisms, such as the VCG 
mechanism if  d is the efficient allocation rule; the mechanisms of Myerson (1981), 
Laffont and Maskin (1980) and Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) in private value 
settings; and Li (2016) and Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2013) with interde-
pendent values. Proposition 1 below shows that the canonical transfers characterize 
the direct mechanisms that achieve belief-free full implementation. This result fol-
lows immediately from the following lemma, which extends analogous results for 
partial implementation in the special cases mentioned above.
10 Consider the first term of (8). Let  ϖ i (θ) ≡  v i (d (θ) , θ) and consider its derivative with respect to  θ i at  θ ̃ ,
  
∂ ϖ i  ____∂ θ i  ( θ ̃) =  ∂ v i  ___∂ x(d ( θ ̃) ,  θ ̃) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( θ ̃) +  ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d ( θ ̃) ,  θ ̃) . 
The first term represents the allocation effect: the variation of  i ’s valuation at  θ ̃ , when the allocation changes due to 
a change in the reported type. The second term is the own preference effect: the variation of  i ’s valuation due to  θ i , 
holding  d ( θ ̃) constant. Integrating both terms with respect to  θ i , we obtain that  ϖ i can be decomposed as
  ϖ i ( θ ̃) =  ∫  θ _ i   θ ̃ i   ∂ v i  ___∂ x(d ( s i ,  θ ̃−i ) ,  s i ,  θ ̃−i ) ⋅  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( s i ,  θ ̃−i ) d s i +  ∫  θ _ i   θ ̃ i   ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d ( s i ,  θ ̃−i ) ,  s i ,  θ ̃−i ) d s i , 
where the first term is the total allocation effect and the second is the total preference effect. Thus, the canonical 
transfer in (8) can be seen as the negative of the total allocation effect of the reported type, given opponents’ reports. 
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LEMMA 1: Suppose that  (d, t) is ex post incentive compatible and differentiable. 
Then, for every  i and for every  m , there exists a function  τ i :  Θ −i → 핉 such that 
 t i (m) =  t i ∗ (m) +  τ i ( m −i ) .
PROPOSITION 1: Allocation rule  d is belief-free fully implementable by a differ-
entiable direct mechanism if and only if it is belief-free fully implemented by the 
canonical direct mechanism.
In many environments of economic interest the canonical direct mechanism is 
strictly concave (see Section IV). Hence, if in such environments strict ex post 
incentive compatibility is possible, full implementation can only fail if the canoni-
cal direct mechanism induces overly strong strategic externalities. We provide next 
a measure of such strategic externalities. For any  i ∈ I , let  W i : M × Θ → 핉 be 
such that
  W i (m; θ) ≔  ( ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , θ) −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) . 
For every  i ∈ I , define the externality gap as
(9)  E G i ≔  max θ, m,  m i ′ 
  (  ∑ j≠i  |  ∂ W i ____∂ m j (m; θ) | −  |  ∂ W i ____∂ m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ; θ) | ) . 
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that the canonical direct mechanism is strictly concave 
in the sense above. Then, if  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly EPIC but not belief-free fully imple-
mentable, then  E G i > 0 for some  i .
To understand this result, note that  W i(m; θ) is the derivative of the ex post payoff 
function of the canonical direct mechanism with respect to  i ’s type, evaluated at 
state  θ , when the reported profile is  m . The externality gap therefore measures the 
maximal difference between the opponents’ ability to jointly affect this derivative 
and agent  i ’s own effect, evaluated across all possible combinations of states and 
reports. Hence,  E G i < 0 means that  i ’s own effect on the first-order condition of the 
canonical direct mechanism always dominates the combined strategic externalities 
at all states and reports. The result then follows from Theorem 1.
B. Full Implementation via Moment Conditions
By the results in Section IIIA, if the canonical direct mechanism is strictly concave 
and strictly ex post incentive compatible, failure to achieve belief-free implementa-
tion is due to the existence of positive externality gaps. In these cases, information 
about beliefs may be useful to weaken the strategic externalities and achieve full 
implementation. In general, also incentive compatibility may be problematic. In that 
case, belief restrictions can be used to ensure both properties.
The next theorem relates the possibility of achieving full implementation to the 
moment conditions consistent with   . As discussed in Section I, the choice of the 
moment condition affects both the design and the degree of robustness achieved by 
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the mechanism. This result thus formalizes the idea that robustness in our model is 
envisioned as a choice of the designer.
THEOREM 2: Allocation rule  d : Θ → X is fully -implementable if there exists a 
-consistent moment condition  ρ =  ( L i ,  f i) i∈I ∈ ϱ () such that, for all  i ,  θ i ,  m i ,  m i ′, 
and for all  μ ∈  C  θ i    
ρ  :
 (i)  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ W i ___∂ m i ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) dμ <  f i ′( m i ) , and
 (ii)  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  |  ∂ W i ___∂ m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) −  f i ′( m i ′) | dμ
     >  ∑ 
j≠i
 ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
 |  ∂ W i ___∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) +  ∂ L  i  ___∂ m j ( m −i ) | dμ .
Moreover, for  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i  ) i∈I ∈ ϱ () that satisfies the two conditions, the fol-
lowing transfers guarantee full   ρ -implementation (hence full -implementation):
(10)  t i ρ (m) =   t i ∗ (m)   ⏟canonical transfers +  L  i ( m −i )  m i −  ∫  θ _ i  
 m i   f i( s i ) d s i  
moment condition-based term
. 
The following (stronger) version of these conditions is often easier to check in 
applications.
Remark 2: The conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied if for all  i , for all  θ ∈ Θ , 
for all  m −i ∈  M −i , and for all  m i ,  m i ′ ∈  M i :
 (i)  ∂ W i ___∂ m i ( m i ,  m −i ; θ) <  f i ′( m i ) ;
 (ii)  |  ∂ W i ___∂ m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ; θ) −  f i ′( m i ′) | >  ∑ j≠i  |  ∂ W i ___∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ; θ) +  ∂ L i ___∂ m j  ( m −i ) | . 
Theorem 2 states two properties of moment conditions that are useful to achieve 
full implementation, and may thus guide the designer’s choice of a suitable moment 
condition. To understand what these are, let us consider the ex post versions stated in 
Remark 2. First, note that if  f i is constant, then Condition 1 ensures that the canonical 
direct mechanism is strictly concave in own action and strictly EPIC. Second, note 
that if the externality gap (9) is negative for all  i , then Condition 2 is satisfied by any 
trivial moment condition, in which  f i and  L  i are constant functions. Since such trivial 
moment conditions are consistent with any belief restrictions, full implementation 
is guaranteed by the canonical direct mechanism in the belief-free sense. Now, sup-
pose that the externality gap is positive for some agent. Condition 2 clarifies which 
properties of beliefs can be used to weaken the strategic externalities: a moment 
condition in which the derivative of  f i has the opposite sign of  ∂ W i/∂ m i can be used 
to increase the own effect, whereas the external effects can be weakened by moment 
functions  L  i with derivatives that contrast the strategic externality in the canonical 
direct mechanism. Condition 1 instead requires that the own effect in the canonical 
direct mechanism is bounded above by the derivative of  f i .
To gain further insights on how these conditions contribute to the full implemen-
tation result, it is useful to consider the transfers that achieve full implementation 
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(equation (10)). With these transfers, the first-order derivative of  θ i ’s expected pay-
off, given  μ ∈ Δ ( M −i ×  Θ −i ) , is
  
∂E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( m i )   =   ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
 [ ( ∂ v i  __∂x(d(m), θ)  −   ∂ v i  __∂ x(d(m), m) )  ∂d __∂ θ i  (m)  +   L i ( m −i )  −   f i( m i ) ] dμ. 
This shows that for any conjectures  μ ∈  C  θ i    
ρ  concentrated on the opponents’ 
truthful profile, the report  m i =  θ i satisfies the first-order conditions. This does not 
necessarily result in strict   ρ -IC, as that also depends on the second-order condi-
tions. But Condition 1 guarantees that the ensuing mechanism is concave, and hence 
the second-order conditions are met. This mechanism therefore is strictly   ρ -IC and 
satisfies the concavity condition in Theorem 1. Full implementation follows from 
the fact that Condition 2 in Theorem 2 also guarantees the   ρ -LSE condition of 
Theorem 1.
Example 7 (Example 1 Redux): Note that applying the formula of the canoni-
cal transfers (8) to Example 1, and dropping all terms that are constant in  i ’s own 
report (and hence do not affect his best response), delivers the VCG transfers in 
(1). It is easy to verify that, in this case,  ∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) = − (1 + γ) and  ∂ W i ___∂ m j (m; θ) = − (1 + γ) γ . Letting  L i ( θ j ) =  (1 + γ) γ  θ j , under the independent uniform com-
mon prior we obtain  f i( θ i ) ≔ E ( L i( θ i ) |  θ i ) = 0.5 ·  (1 + γ) γ , and hence  ∂ L  i  ___∂ θ j ( θ j ) =  (1 + γ) γ and  f i ′( θ i ) = 0 . Thus, both conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied 
for  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i) i∈ {1, 2}  , and in fact with the RHS of Condition 2 equal to 0. Clearly, 
these moment conditions only rely on common knowledge that  E ( θ j |  θ i ) = 0.5 , and 
applying the formula in (10) to moment condition  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i) i∈ {1, 2}  we obtain the 
adjusted transfers (3) in Example 1.
IV. Applications and Extensions
In this section we illustrate how Theorem 2 can be applied to special cases of 
interest, under different assumptions on agents’ beliefs. We also show further robust-
ness properties of the design strategy put forward in Theorem 2.
A. SCC-Environments: A Robustness Trade-Off
For simplicity, in this subsection we maintain that  X ⊆ 핉 . A common assump-
tion in applications is the following single-crossing condition (SCC).
ASSUMPTION 1 (SCC): For all  i ∈ I and  (x, θ) ,   ∂ 2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ i  (x, θ) > 0 .
The next lemma generalizes standard results on ex post (partial) implementation.
LEMMA 2: In environments that satisfy Assumption 1, the canonical direct mecha-
nism  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly ex post incentive compatible if and only if  d is strictly increas-
ing in each  θ i .
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Because of this result, in the following we refer to SCC-environments as those 
that (in addition to the maintained assumptions) satisfy Assumption 1 and such that 
d is strictly increasing in each  θ i . The next result, which follows immediately from 
Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, summarizes easy-to-check conditions for belief-free full 
implementation in SCC-environments.11
PROPOSITION 2: In SCC-environments, the allocation rule  d is belief-free fully 
implementable if  
∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) < 0 and  |  ∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) | >  ∑ j≠i  |  ∂ W i ___∂ m j ( m i ′ ,  m −i ; θ) | for all  i ,  θ , m , and  m i ′ . 
Hence, in SCC-environments, belief-free full implementation may fail only if the 
canonical direct mechanism is not globally concave or if there are positive exter-
nality gaps. Proposition 2 therefore highlights a trade-off in SCC-environments, 
between the robustness of the partial implementation result—obtained by the canon-
ical direct mechanism in a belief-free sense—and the possibility of achieving full 
implementation: the latter necessarily relies on belief restrictions and therefore 
reduces the robustness of the partial implementation result.
To simplify the analysis, we first consider the following assumptions on the val-
uation functions  v i , and the allocation rule  d. 
ASSUMPTION 2 (SCC-PC): (i) For each  i and  j ,  ∂ 2  v i / ∂ 2 x and  ∂ 2  v i /∂ x ∂ θ j are 
constant in  θ ; (ii)  d is linear in  θ :   ∂ 2 d _____ ∂ θ i ∂ θ j (θ) = 0 for all  i ,  j , and  θ .
A special case of these conditions is provided by environments with quadratic 
valuations and linear allocation functions.12 Assumption 2 also accommodates 
more general dependence on  x , as long as the concavity and the cross deriva-
tives are public information. We thus refer to the SCC-environments which also 
satisfy Assumption 2 as SCC-environments with public concavity (SCC-PC). 
This assumption, however, is not essential to our analysis. In Section IVA we 
discuss how the results are affected when it is relaxed. Note that, in SCC-PC 
environments,  
∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) < 0 for all  (m, θ) . Hence, by Proposition 2, belief-free 
implementation fails only if there are positive externality gaps; in this case if 
 |   ∂ 2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d (m) , m) | ≤  ∑ j≠i    |   ∂ 2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m) | for some  m and  i .
11 This result is related to Bergemann and Morris (2009a)—henceforth, BM—who characterize belief-free imple-
mentation via direct mechanisms in environments with monotone aggregators (i.e., such that  ∀ i ,  v i (x, θ) =  w i (x,  h i(θ) ) for some  w i : X × 핉 → 핉 and  h i : Θ → 핉 strictly increasing in  θ i ). BM’s characterization is in terms of strict 
EPIC and the following contraction property (BM, Definition 5):  ∀ β : Θ →  2 Θ such that  θ ∈ β (θ) for all  θ , but β (θ′) ≠ {θ′ } for some  θ′ , there exists  i ,  θ i , and  θ i ′′ ∈  β i ( θ i ) with  θ i ′′ ≠  θ i such that, for all  θ −i and  θ −i ′ ∈  β −i ( θ −i ) , 
 sign( θ i −  θ i ′′ ) = sign( h i ( θ i ,  θ −i ) −  h  i (  θ i ′′ ,  θ −i ′ )) . In SCC-environments that satisfy both BM’s aggregator prop-
erty (which we do not assume) and our smoothness assumptions (Section I), it can be shown that our condi-
tion implies BM’s contraction property. The converse holds if the aggregators are also symmetric (i.e., such that 
 ∂ h  i (θ) /∂ θ i = ∂ h j(θ) /∂ θ j and  ∑ k≠i   (∂ h  i (θ) /∂ θ k ) =  ∑ k≠j   (∂ h j(θ) /∂ θ k ) for all  i, j , and  θ ) and the environment sat-
isfies our Assumption 2. Environments with symmetric aggregators include the examples in Section IA, where our 
condition also coincides with Chung and Ely’s (2001) sufficient condition for environments with linear aggregators. 
12 Quadratic-linear models are common in the literature, as they ensure linear best-responses. Examples include 
social interactions models (e.g., Blume et al. 2015), markets with network externalities (e.g., Fainmesser and 
Galeotti 2015), supply function competition (e.g., Vives 2011), divisible good auctions (e.g., Wilson 1979) and 
public goods (e.g., Duggan and Roberts 2002). 
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Common Prior Models.—As explained in Section I, in common prior envi-
ronments the belief restrictions  are such that for every  i and  θ i ,  B  θ i  =  { b  θ i  } , 
where  b  θ i  = p ( · |  θ i ) ∈ Δ ( Θ −i ) for some  p ∈ Δ (Θ) . Then,   -IC coincides with 
interim-IC, and one could similarly refer to   -DS implementation as interim dom-
inant strategy implementation. (If  is a standard common prior model,   -DS 
implementation is equivalent to truthful revelation being strictly dominant in the 
interim normal form of the Bayesian game.) Since, in the following, the common 
prior assumption is maintained, we will take expectations without making the prior 
explicit. So, for instance, given a function  L  i :  Θ −i → 핉 , we will simply write 
E ( L  i ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) instead of  ∫  Θ −i   L  i ( θ −i ) dp ( · |  θ i ) .
Independent Types.—In an independent common prior model, for any 
 L  i :  Θ −i → 핉 , the condition  E ( L  i ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) =  f i( θ i ) holds true with  f i :  Θ i → 핉 
such that  f i ′ = 0 (by the definition of independence). Hence, since  L  i can be chosen 
freely in common prior models, independence leaves us enough leeway to manipu-
late the external effects on the RHS of Condition 2 of Theorem 2, without affecting 
the LHS. In particular, the ex post condition of Remark 2 can be rewritten as
(11)  | (  ∂ 2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) |  >  ∑ j≠i  | (−  ∂ 2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m)  +   ∂ L i ____∂ m j  ( m −i ) | . 
Hence, in this case we can completely neutralize the strategic externalities, setting 
the RHS of this inequality equal to zero, by choosing  L ˆi such that
(12)  ∂ L ˆi  ___∂ m j ( m −i ) =  (  ∂ 
2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m)  for all m and j ≠ i, or
(13)  L ˆi ( m −i ) =  ∑ 
j≠i(  ∂ 
2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m) ·  m j )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) . 
(Equations (12) and (13) are well defined because Assumption 2 ensures that the 
RHS of (12) is constant in  m i .) Hence, the following proposition holds.
PROPOSITION 3: In SCC-PC-environments with an independent common prior, 
the following transfers ensure full implementation in interim dominant strategies:
(14)  t i ρ (m) =   t i ∗ (m)   ⏟canonical transfers +   L ˆi ( m −i )  m i  
 
compensation for 
  strategic externality 
(depends on  m i and  m −i )
 
  −   ∫  θ _ i   m i  E ( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  s i ) d s i  
 
belief-based adjustment: cumulative
   expected marginal compensation   
(only depends on  m i )
 
 .
To understand the logic of the mechanism, consider the function  L ˆi ( m −i ) defined 
in (13). The term in parentheses represents the effect of  j ’s report on  i ’s marginal 
utility for  x , and is multiplied by the impact of  i ’s report on the allocation. Overall, 
this is the total strategic externality that agent  i is subject to, for each increment 
of his own report. The transfers in (14) therefore are such that, starting from the 
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 canonical direct mechanism, agent  i is compensated for the total strategic external-
ity that other players impose on him. The last term in (14) is the expected marginal 
effect on such a compensation, when  i reports  m i . This term is added to prevent the 
agent from misreporting his type, in order to inflate the compensation for the stra-
tegic externality. Hence, the first term eliminates the strategic externalities, and the 
second restores incentive compatibility.
Affiliated Types.—Under the maintained assumptions for SCC-PC-environments, 
and if valuations are supermodular (that is,  0 <   ∂ 2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ j  (x, θ) < ∞ for all  i ,  j ,  x, 
and  θ ), the moment functions  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 defined in (13) are strictly increas-
ing in  m j for each  j ≠ i . Then, if types are affiliated, Theorem 5 in Milgrom and 
Weber (1982) implies that  E(  L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) is increasing in  θ i . Hence, letting  f ˆ i ( · ) ≡ E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) | · ) , the moment condition  ρ = ( L ˆi ,  f ˆ i ) ∈ ϱ () satisfies  f ˆ i ′ > 0 for 
all  i . By construction,  L ˆi is such that the RHS of Condition 2 in Theorem 2 is equal 
to zero. Since  f ˆ i ′ > 0 , SCC implies that the LHS of the same condition is positive. 
The next result follows.
PROPOSITION 4: In SCC-PC-environments with affiliated types and supermodu-
lar valuations, the transfers in (14) ensure full implementation in interim dominant 
strategies.
Equivalence of EPIC and DS-implementability.—The results above can also be 
used to derive an equivalence between ex post incentive compatibility and dominant 
strategy implementation.
PROPOSITION 5: In independent common prior environments that satisfy 
Assumptions 1 and 2, an allocation function is interim dominant strategy imple-
mentable if and only if the canonical direct mechanism is strictly ex post incentive 
compatible. If valuations are supermodular, the equivalence extends to affiliated types.
In the proof, in the Appendix, first we show that an allocation rule is interim 
dominant strategy implementable only if it is strictly increasing. The “only if ” part 
then follows from Lemma 2. Conversely, if  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly EPIC, then  d is strictly 
increasing by Lemma 2. Propositions 3 and 4 in turn imply that the allocation rule is 
interim dominant strategy implementable.
Proposition 5 is related to results by Manelli and Vincent (2010)—henceforth, 
MV—and Gershkov et al. (2013) which show that, in Bayesian environments with 
private values, for any interim incentive-compatible mechanism there is an equiva-
lent mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible. Given the restriction 
to private values, those results can be interpreted as an equivalence between partial 
and full implementation in direct mechanisms. From this viewpoint, Proposition 5 
can be seen as a generalization of that insight to Bayesian environments with inter-
dependent values.13 MV’s notion of equivalence, however, is different from ours. In 
13 We are grateful to Stephen Morris for this insight. 
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particular, MV define two mechanisms as equivalent if they deliver the same interim 
expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. Here 
instead we maintain the traditional notion of equivalence, which requires that the 
mechanisms induce the same ex post allocation. (As shown by Gershkov et al. 2013, 
equivalence results à la MV do not extend beyond environments with linear utilities 
and independent types.)
Moment Conditions without a Prior.—In real-world problems of mechanism 
design, the designer’s information typically does not take the form of a common 
prior distribution on agents’ types. For instance, when the designer’s information is 
based on econometric estimates, and if such estimates are assumed common knowl-
edge, then the belief restrictions   are naturally represented directly in terms of 
a set of moment conditions (cf. Section IB). In these cases, it may be interesting 
to ask which moments it would be useful to estimate, provided they are common 
knowledge.14 The next result shows that, in SCC-PC-environments, the conditional 
expectations  E ( θ j |  θ i ) are all that is needed for the implementation result.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider a SCC-PC-environment with supermodular valuations. 
Let the belief restrictions   – be such that only common knowledge of the conditional 
expectations  E ( θ j |  θ i ) is maintained, for all  i and  j . If such conditional expectations 
are differentiable and nondecreasing in  θ i for each  i and  j , then the transfers in 
equation (14) ensure   – -implementation in   – -dominant strategies.
The proof, in the Appendix, is based on the observation that the func-
tion  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 defined in equation (13) is linear if the environment satisfies 
the SCC-PC conditions. Hence, if the conditional expectations  E ( θ j |  θ i ) are common 
knowledge in   – , so are the conditional expectations  E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) , which can thus be 
used as moment conditions to weaken the strategic externalities, similar to what we 
did for the common prior environments in Propositions 3 and 4.
Discussion.—The logic of Propositions 3, 4, and 5 extends beyond the cases of 
common prior models with independent or affiliated types. To see this, notice that 
for  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 defined in equation (13), the maintained assumptions for SCC-
PC-environments guarantee that the RHS of Condition 2 in Theorem 2 is equal 
to 0. Affiliation or independence further guarantee that the conditional moment 
 E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) is nondecreasing in  θ i Hence, letting  f ˆ i ( θ i ) ≔ E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) , the 
moment condition  ρ =  ( L ˆi ,  f ˆ i ) i∈I can be used with no risk of upsetting the LHS 
of Condition 2 in Theorem 2. This argument, however, remains valid whenever 
 E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  m i ) <  ∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) for all  m , which ensures that both conditions of 
Theorem 2 are satisfied by  ρ =  ( L ˆi ,  f ˆ i ) i∈I . In Proposition 6, the assumption that 
 E ( θ j |  θ i ) are nondecreasing in  θ i plays the same role as the assumptions of indepen-
dence and affiliation in the common prior models, and can be weakened similarly.
14 Ollár and Penta (2017) consider a different non-Bayesian setting, in which types are commonly believed to 
follow the same distribution, but the distribution itself is unknown. 
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Assumption 2 may also be weakened in Propositions 3, 4, and 6. In the argu-
ment above, we used the assumption to ensure  ∂ W i/∂ m i < 0 and that  L ˆi could be 
designed to completely neutralize the strategic externalities of the canonical direct 
mechanism. Clearly,  ∂ W i/∂ m i < 0 can be guaranteed by weaker conditions. If 
Assumption 2 is violated, however, then we may not be able to completely off-
set the strategic externalities. But if  |  ∂ 2 d/∂ θ i ∂ θ j | and the variations of the valu-
ations’ concavity are small relative to  | ∂ W i/∂ m i | , then  L ˆi can still be chosen so 
that the RHS of (11) is bounded above by  | ∂ W i/∂ m i  | , and the argument remains 
valid. The only difference is that full implementation would not occur in one round of 
  -rationalizability: that is, the transfers would ensure   -implementation, but not in 
 -dominant strategies.
B. Sensitivity Analysis and Approximate Moment Conditions
The implementation result in Theorem 2 is robust in the sense that only common 
knowledge of a certain moment condition is required. But what if such a moment 
condition is not exactly satisfied? How sensitive are the implementation results to 
possible misspecifications of the moment condition? In this section we show that 
our design strategy also ensures that the mechanism is well behaved with respect to 
small misspecifications of the moment conditions.
Example 8 (Sensitivity Analysis): Consider the environment in Example 2. 
Adopting the design strategy of Theorem 2, we showed that the strategic exter-
nalities of the VCG mechanism could be sufficiently reduced, so as to induce con-
tractive best responses, adopting the moment condition  γκE ( θ k −  θ j |  θ i ) = 0 . 
But what if  γκE ( θ k −  θ j |  θ i ) is only within  ε of  0 , so that the moment condition 
is not exactly satisfied? Then, for any  θ i , the set of rationalizable reports consis-
tent with common belief that  γκE( θ k −  θ j |  θ i ) ∈  [0 ± ε] ≔ [−ε, +ε ] is equal to 
 R i  ( θ i ) =  [ θ i ±  1 ________  (1 −  |γ + δ| ) κ · ε] . 
Thus, small misspecifications of the moment condition induce small misreports, 
and hence (given the continuity of  d ) small misallocation relative to the designer’s 
objective. Moreover, the impact of the misspecified moment condition is increasing 
in  | γ + δ | , which measures the strategic externalities in the belief-based mecha-
nism (and such that  | γ + δ | < 1 in Example 2), and decreasing in the concavity in 
own-action, captured by  κ ≡ (1 + γ + δ) > 0 . Thus, the resilience to such mis-
specifications is improved by mechanisms with smaller strategic externalities, and 
maximally so if they achieve   -DS implementation, or by mechanisms with larger 
concavity in own action. (In Example 1, the rationalizable reports if the moment 
condition is misspecified are  R i  ( θ i ) =  [ θ i ± ε/ (1 + γ) ] .)
Our next result generalizes these insights. In particular, we show that concave 
mechanisms with limited strategic externalities ensure continuity with respect to 
misspecifications of the moment conditions, and we characterize the impact of such 
misspecifications, relating it to the strength of the strategic externalities. To this end, 
consider the transfers in (10), and suppose that  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i) i∈I satisfies the  conditions 
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of Theorem 2. Then, for any  θ i ∈  Θ i , we define the smallest own-concavity and 
strongest strategic externality for  θ i , respectively as
  O C i ρ ( θ i ) ≔  min  ( m i ′, μ) ∈ M i× C  θ i    ρ   
   ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  |  ∂ W i ____∂ m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) −  f i ′( m i ′) |  dμ  and
 S E i ρ ( θ i ) ≔  max  ( m i ′, μ) ∈ M i× C  θ i    ρ   
   ∑ 
j≠i
 ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  |  ∂ W i ____∂ m j ( m i ′ ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) +  ∂ L  i  ____∂ m j ( m −i ) |  dμ. 
We also define the overall own-concavity and normalized strategic externalities, 
respectively, as  O C ρ ≔  min i∈I,  θ i ∈ Θ i   O C i ρ ( θ i ) , and  NS E ρ =  max i∈I,  θ i ∈ Θ i    S E i 
ρ ( θ i )  ______
O C i ρ ( θ i )  . (In 
Examples 2 and 8,  O C ρ = κ and  NS E ρ =  | δ + γ | < 1 . In Examples 1 and 7, 
NS E ρ = 0 and  O C ρ =  | 1 + γ | .) Notice that  O C i ρ ( θ i ) and  S E i ρ ( θ i ) correspond, 
respectively, to the LHS and RHS of Condition 2 in Theorem 2. Hence, under the 
conditions of Theorem 2,  O C ρ > 0 and  NS E ρ ∈ [0, 1) . In this case, best responses 
are contractive, and more so as  NS E ρ gets smaller. The difference  (1 − NS E ρ ) there-
fore provides a measure of contractiveness. We next show that these terms also cap-
ture the sensitivity to misspecifications of the moment condition  ρ .
THEOREM 3: Suppose that  ρ =  ( L i ,  f i  ) i∈I satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) of 
Theorem 2, but it is only approximately satisfied in   : that is, for all  i,  θ i , and 
 b i ∈  B  θ i  ,  E  b i ( L  i ( θ −i ) ) ∈  [  f i( θ i ) ± ε] for some  ε > 0 . Then, the transfers  ( t i ρ ) i∈I 
defined in (10) achieve almost truthful   -implementation. That is, for all  i and 
  θ i ∈  Θ i ,  R i  ( θ i ) ⊆  [ θ i ±  1 __________  (1 − NS E ρ ) O C ρ ε] . 
This result implies a convenient continuity property: as the misspecification 
of the moment condition vanishes ( ε → 0 ), the mechanism approaches truthful 
implementation. Moreover, for given  ε > 0 , deviations from truthful implementa-
tion decrease with the own-concavity and increase with the strategic externalities. 
The latter effect is minimal when  NS E ρ = 0 , that is if the mechanism achieves 
dominant-strategy implementation. Hence, Theorem 3 provides further reasons for 
pursuing the design of concave mechanisms with limited strategic externalities.
Theorem 3 can also be seen as a generalization of Theorem 2 to accom-
modate approximate moment conditions. Formally, for any   and  ε ≥ 0 , let 
 ϱ (, ε) denote the set of moment conditions that are approximately consistent with 
 :  ρ =  ( L i ,  f i) i∈I ∈ ϱ (, ε) if and only if for all  i,  θ i and  b i ∈  B  θ i  ,  E  b i ( L  i ( θ −i ) ) ∈  [  f i( θ i ) ± ε] . Clearly,  ϱ (, 0) = ϱ () and the set  ϱ (, ε) increases with  ε : for 
any   ,  ε′ > ε implies  ϱ (, ε) ⊆ ϱ (, ε′) . Then the following result holds.
COROLLARY 2: Let  ρ =  ( L  i ,  f i) i∈I ∈ ϱ (, ε) satisfy Conditions (i) and (ii) of 
Theorem 2. Then, the transfers  ( t i ρ ) i∈I defined in (10) ensure that for all  i and  θ i ∈  Θ i , 
 R i  ( θ i ) ⊆  [ θ i ±  1 __________  (1 − NS E ρ ) O C ρ ε] .
Hence, for exact moment conditions ( ε = 0 ), we obtain the truthful implementa-
tion result of Theorem 2 as a special case. As  ε increases and approximate moment 
conditions are included, misreports are possible, but they remain small and thus 
2265Ollár and Penta: Full ImPlementatIOn and BelIeF restrIctIOnsVOl. 107 nO. 8
(given the continuity of  d ) ensure that the allocation stays close to the designer’s 
objective. Corollary 2 thus suggests a notion of approximate implementation rem-
iniscent of virtual implementation, but with the difference that here the allocation 
is guaranteed to be nearby in the allocation space, rather than the space of lotteries.
V. Related Literature
Our work is related to several strands of the literature in game theory and mecha-
nism design. We briefly discuss the most closely related literature.
Solution Concept.—As explained in Section II,   -rationalizability is a special 
case of  Δ -rationalizability (Battigalli 2003 and Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003), 
and generalizes several versions of rationalizability for incomplete information 
games, including Bergemann and Morris’s (2009a) belief-free version (obtained 
letting   =   BF ) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris’s (2007) interim correlated 
rationalizability (ICR), if   is a standard Bayesian model. ICR has also been studied 
by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007, 2011, 2013) and Penta (2012, 2013). Battigalli et 
al. (2011) provide a thorough analysis of the connections between these and other 
versions of rationalizability.
Full Implementation.—Within the vast literature on full implementation, the 
closest papers are Bergemann and Morris (2009a) and Oury and Tercieux (2012), 
which study implementation in belief-free rationalizability and ICR, respectively. 
Both belief-free and ICR-implementation are special cases of ours, with the proviso 
that Oury and Tercieux (2012) do not restrict attention to direct mechanisms. The 
restriction to direct mechanisms is also shared by Bergemann and Morris (2009a), 
while Bergemann and Morris (2011) study belief-free implementation in general 
mechanisms. Within the classical literature, Jackson (1991) and Postlewaite and 
Schmeidler (1986) are also connected, as our results imply Bayes-Nash implemen-
tation in Bayesian environments. From a conceptual viewpoint, our departure from 
that literature is inspired by Jackson’s (1992) critique of unbounded mechanisms, 
although we push the concern for relevance a bit further, requiring that full imple-
mentation be achieved via transfer schemes.15 In a complete information setting 
with quadratic preferences, Bergemann and Morris (2007) show that an ascend-
ing auction may reduce strategic uncertainty relative to its sealed-bid counterpart, 
thereby making full implementation easier (in the symmetric example with  n agents, 
full implementation is possible in the ascending auction if  γ < 1 , as opposed to 
γ < 1/(n − 1) in the static auction). That insight, however, relies on the complete 
information assumption (see Penta 2015) and is orthogonal to the reduction of  strategic 
externalities we pursue here (which ensures implementation for all  γ in the examples).
Robust Mechanism Design.—As already discussed, most of the literature on 
robust mechanism design has focused on the belief-free case (see footnote 2). In 
15 d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1998) also studied full implementation in environments with trans-
ferable utility, but they resort to unbounded mechanisms of the kind criticized above. Duggan and Roberts (2002) 
fully implement the efficient allocation of pollution via transfers, but under complete information and richer reports. 
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 particular, Bergemann and Morris (2005, 2009a, b) study belief-free implementa-
tion in static settings, respectively in the partial, full, and virtual implementation 
sense. The belief-free approach has been extended to dynamic settings by Müller 
(2016) and Penta (2015). Penta (2015) considers dynamic mechanisms in environ-
ments in which agents may obtain information over time, and applies a dynamic ver-
sion of rationalizability based on a backward induction logic (Penta 2011). Müller 
(2016) instead considers virtual implementation via dynamic mechanisms, in the 
same (static) belief-free environments as Bergemann and Morris (2009b), using a 
stronger version of rationalizability with forward induction. Thanks to the stron-
ger assumptions on the belief revision policy, he shows that dynamic mechanisms 
weaken the conditions for virtual implementation.
Beyond the belief-free literature, Guo and Yannelis (2017) and Lopomo, Rigotti, 
and Shannon (2014) consider belief restrictions analogous to ours, to study, respec-
tively, full and partial implementation, but with different notions of robustness that 
involve ambiguity. Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013) also maintain some 
restrictions on beliefs, but focus on virtual implementation. Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, 
and Moldovanu (2012) show that, under certain restrictions on preferences, mini-
mal notions of robustness are as demanding as the belief-free case when types are 
multidimensional, and Jehiel et al. (2006) show that ex post incentive compatibility 
is generically impossible for multidimensional types. This suggests that, when   is 
not a standard type space, the one-dimensionality of  Θ i is important for our results.
Alternative approaches to robust mechanism design have been put forward by 
Borgers and Smith (2012, 2014), who show the role of eliciting beliefs to weakly 
implement a correspondence in a belief-free setting, or by Carroll (2015), Yamashita 
(2015), and Wolitzky (2016), who approach robustness from a max-min perspec-
tive. Kos and Messner (2015) also pursue the max-min approach, but in a setting in 
which—similar to one of our applications (Section IVA)—only the types’ expected 
values are known.
Mechanism Design with Transferable Utility (TU).—TU-environments are the 
typical domain of the partial implementation literature. Within this area, the closest 
works are those that allow for interdependent values (e.g., Crémer and McLean 
1985, 1988; Dasgupta and Maskin 2000; McLean and Postlewaite 2004).16 In 
recent years, standard implementation problems have been revisited imposing extra 
desiderata on the mechanisms. Deb and Pai (2017), for instance, pursue symmetry 
of the mechanism. Mathevet (2010) and Mathevet and Taneva (2013) instead pur-
sue supermodularity. In those papers, the extra desiderata are achieved by adding 
a belief-dependent component to some baseline payments, much as we attain full 
implementation appending an extra term to the canonical transfers.17 Those papers 
however maintain that types are independently distributed, whereas we allow gen-
eral correlations as well as weaker restrictions on beliefs. At a more technical level, 
16 McLean and Postlewaite (2002) explore related ideas in environments without transferable utility. 
17 Early examples of this principle are the mechanisms of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and of Crémer 
and McLean (1985), which append the baseline VCG mechanism with a belief-based component in order to achieve 
budget balance and surplus extraction, respectively. 
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our design results in a contractive mechanism. Healy and Mathevet (2012) also 
pursue contractiveness of the mechanism, but with complete information.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The objective of full implementation is to solve the problem of multiplicity in 
mechanism design. In this paper we developed an approach to full implementation 
which subsumes as special cases the notions of belief-free (Bergemann and Morris 
2009a) and ICR-implementation (Oury and Tercieux 2012), and accommodates 
more realistic assumptions on agents’ beliefs, intermediate between the belief-free 
and the classical Bayesian benchmarks. In Bayesian settings, which are standard in 
the applied and classical literature, our conditions also ensure Bayes-Nash imple-
mentation (e.g., Jackson 1991). The main innovation is that we achieve these results 
through mechanisms which are as simple as those developed by the partial imple-
mentation literature, thereby bridging two branches of the literature which have typ-
ically proceeded in parallel.
While largely inspired by the literature on belief-free mechanism design, we 
departed from it in many ways. The capability of our framework to accommodate 
general belief restrictions was key to go beyond the existing characterizations, and 
to provide constructive results on what can still be achieved when agents’ prefer-
ences violate the conditions for belief-free implementation. The key idea is to focus 
on the strategic externalities rather than preferences, and to use moment conditions 
to induce contractive best replies. Our results suggest a clear design principle: start 
with the canonical transfers and then add a belief-based component to weaken the 
strategic externalities which may otherwise impair the full implementation result. 
The resulting mechanism is contractive and induces truthful revelation as the only 
rationalizable outcome.
As shown in Section IVB, mechanisms with small strategic externalities ensure 
further robustness properties, in that small misspecifications of the moment condi-
tions result in allocations that are proportionately close to the desired one. Though 
beyond the scope of this paper, this suggests that the logic of our construction may 
be extended to moment conditions with inequalities. The notion of closeness here is 
in terms of the natural allocation space, as opposed to the lottery space of the virtual 
implementation literature, which points to a novel notion of approximate implemen-
tation which may be of independent interest for future research.
Other directions for future research include extending the analysis to nondifferen-
tiable allocation rules, such as for instance in standard auction problems. A sensible 
first step in this direction might be to apply our analysis to smooth approximations 
of such nondifferentiable allocation rules. But the idea of using  belief-restrictions to 
weaken the strategic externalities seems more broadly appealing, and there may be 
direct ways of formalizing it in the context of nonsmooth environments. The restric-
tion to direct mechanisms also entails some loss of generality, and thus stronger 
results could be obtained with more general mechanisms. But we already know that 
some loss of generality is necessary, if we want to avoid the unrealistically complex 
mechanisms of the classical literature. Thus, a key challenge in pursuing this direc-
tion of research is to combine the increased generality with the ability to provide 
clear economic insights.
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In Section V we discussed some implications of our main results for some spe-
cial cases, such as environments with single-crossing preferences, with and without 
common priors. In common prior environments, we provided sufficient conditions 
for full implementation with independent and correlated types, as well as for an 
equivalence of partially and fully implementable allocation rules. In environments 
with public concavity, our construction indeed ensures that strategic externalities are 
completely eliminated, thereby achieving dominant strategy implementation. When 
this is the case, our results also imply max-min implementation (e.g., Carroll 2015 
and Wolitzky 2016).
Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: 
Let  l ≔  max i,  θ i   { max  m i ∈ R i  ( θ i )    |  m i −  θ i | } denote the largest distance between 
the truthful and some other rationalizable report, across all types. Note that  l is 
well defined by properties of  Θ and by the maintained assumptions on  v ,  d , and  t . 
By contradiction, suppose that  l > 0 , and let  i ,  θ i ∗ , and  m i ∗ ∈  R i  ( θ i ∗ ) 
be such that  |  m i ∗ −  θ i ∗ | = l . Since  m i ∗ ∈  R i  ( θ i ∗ ) ,  ∃ μ ∈  C  θ i ∗   ∩ Δ ( R −i  ) :  m i ∗ ∈ arg  max  m i   E U  θ i ∗  μ ( m i ) . (This standard fixed-point property of   -rationalizability fol-
lows from the maintained assumptions on  v ,  d , and  t , which ensure that our mech-
anisms induce compact games with bounded and continuous payoff functions, e.g., 
Arieli 2010.) By   -IC we also know that  θ i ∈  R i  ( θ i ) for all  θ i and  i , hence the set 
of truthtelling conjectures  C i T ≔  {μ such that μ { ( θ −i ,  m −i ) :  m −i =  θ −i } = 1} ⊆ Δ ( R −i  ) . Let  μ ∗ ∈  C i T be such that  marg  Θ −i   μ ∗  =  marg  Θ −i   μ . Then,   -IC 
implies that  θ i ∗ ∈ arg  max  m i   E U  θ i ∗   μ 
∗  ( m i ) .
By the strict concavity assumption, best responses are unique and minimize the 
absolute value of the derivative of the expected utility function. We examine the 
difference in the first-order conditions at the optimum for  μ and  μ ∗ , for the case 
in which  m i ∗ >  θ i ∗ (the proof is analogous for  m i ∗ <  θ i ∗ ):  ∂ E  U  θ i ∗  
μ  _____∂ m i  ( m i ∗ ) −  
∂ E  U  θ i ∗   μ 
∗   _____∂ m i  ( θ i ∗ ) , where for any  θ i ,  m i , and  μ ,
(B1)  ∂ E U  θ i  
μ
 ______∂ m i  ( m i ) =  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) dμ. 
Since, by assumption,  E U  θ i ∗  μ ( m i ) is strictly concave and maximized at  m i ∗ , whereas 
E U  θ i ∗   μ 
∗  ( m i ) is strictly concave and maximized at  θ i ∗ , if  m i ∗ >  θ i ∗ it follows that 
 
∂ E U  θ i ∗  μ  _____∂ m i  ( m i ∗ ) −  
∂ E U  θ i ∗   μ 
∗   _____∂ m i  ( θ i ∗ ) ≥ 0 . Using (B1), this can be rewritten as
  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( m i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ −  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) d μ ∗ ≥ 0 .
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Next, we add and subtract  ∫  M −i × Θ −i   ∂ U i ___∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ , and rearrange terms to obtain
  픸 i ≔  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ −  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( m i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ
≤  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ −  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) d μ ∗ ≕  픹 i . 
By the mean value theorem, there exists  m i ′ ∈  [ θ i ∗ ,  m i ∗ ] such that
  픸 i =  ( ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
   ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i ( m i ′ ,  m −i ;  θ i 
∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ) ·  ( θ i ∗ −  m i ∗ ) . 
Since  l =  ( m i ∗ −  θ i ∗ ) > 0 , and expected payoffs are strictly concave, this can 
be written as
  픸 i =  |  ∫  M −i × Θ −i      ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i ( m i ′,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) · dμ | · l. 
Since  marg  Θ −i   μ ∗  =  marg  Θ −i   μ  and  μ ∗ ∈  C i T , the term  픹 i can be written as
  픹 i =  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ −  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∂ U i ____∂ m i ( θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) dμ  
  ≤  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∑ 
j≠i( |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j  ( θ i ∗ ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) | ·  |  θ j −  m j | ) dμ
 ≤  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∑ 
j≠i
 |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) | dμ · l, 
where the first bound follows from the mean-value theorem (applied to  ∂ U i/∂ m i 
and  m −i ) and the triangle inequality, whereas the second bound follows from the 
maximality of  l . Since, from above,  픸 i ≤  픹 i , we have that
  |  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
   ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i ( m i ′,  m −i ;  θ i 
∗ ,  θ −i ) · dμ |  ≤  ∫  M −i × Θ −i  
 
  ∑ 
j≠i
 |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j ( m i ,  m −i ;  θ i ∗ ,  θ −i ) | dμ, 
which contradicts the   -LSE condition for  i .  ∎ 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
If the direct mechanism  (d, t) is ex post incentive compatible, then the first- 
order conditions, which guarantee that truthful revelation is an ex post  equilibrium, 
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imply that  ( ∂ v i  ___∂ x(d (m) , θ) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (m) +  ∂ t i  ___ ∂ m i (m) )  |  m=θ = 0 for all  i and  θ . Hence, 
 
∂ t i  ___ ∂ m i (θ) = −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x  (d (θ) , θ) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ)  for all θ . Integrating over  m i , it follows that for 
every  m ,
(B2)  t i ( m i ,  m −i ) = − ∫  θ _ i   m i   ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (s,  m −i ) , s,  m −i ) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (s,  m −i ) ds + K ( m −i ) . 
For every  i , let  ϖ i : Θ → 핉 be such that  ϖ i ( θ i ,  θ −i ) =  v i (d ( θ i ,  θ −i ) ,  θ i ,  θ −i ) , and 
notice that
  
∂ ϖ i  ____∂ θ i  ( θ i ,  θ −i ) =  
∂ v i  ___∂ x (d ( θ i ,  θ −i ) ,  θ i ,  θ −i ) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( θ i ,  θ −i ) +  ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d ( θ i ,  θ −i ) ,  θ i ,  θ −i ) . 
Thus, (B2) can be rewritten as
  t i ( m i ,  m −i ) = − ∫  θ _ i   m i   ∂ ϖ i  ____∂ θ i  (s,  m −i ) ds +  ∫  θ _  i  
 m i   ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d (s,  m −i ) , s,  m −i ) ds + K ( m −i ) 
 = − v i (d ( m i ,  m −i ) ,  m i ,  m −i ) 
+  ∫  θ _  i   m i   ∂ v i  ___∂ θ i (d (s,  m −i ) , s,  m −i ) ds + K ( m −i ) +  v i (d ( θ _ i ,  m −i ) ,  θ _  i ,  m −i ) . 
Recall the canonical transfers  t ∗ as in (8) and notice that the result follows by let-
ting  τ −i ( m −i ) = K ( m −i ) +  v i (d ( θ _ i ,  m −i ) ,  θ _ i ,  m −i ) .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
The “if ” part is immediate. For the “only if,” suppose that  d is belief-free imple-
mented by a direct mechanism with transfer scheme  t . Then, the direct mecha-
nism  (d, t) is strictly ex post incentive compatible and Lemma 1 implies that  t i (m) =  t i ∗ (m) +  τ i ( m −i ) for some  τ i :  M −i → 핉 . Hence,  (d, t) and the canonical direct 
mechanism  (d,  t ∗ ) induce the same ex post best responses, and hence the same sets 
of belief-free Rationalizable strategies. The canonical direct mechanism therefore 
also belief-free implements  d . ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: 
The proof is as explained in the main text: with transfers as in (10), truthful reve-
lation satisfies the first-order conditions for any  μ ∈  C i T . Condition 1 in Theorem 2 
ensures the strict concavity condition in Theorem 1, and so the second-order con-
ditions are also satisfied. The mechanism therefore is   -IC. Condition 2 in the 
Theorem implies the   -LSE Condition of Theorem 1. The result thus follows from 
Theorem 1.  ∎ 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
Notice that in the canonical direct mechanism,
(B3)  ∂ U i ____∂ m i (m; θ) =  ( 
∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , θ) −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) ≕  W i(m; θ) . 
Hence, if opponents are truthful, then truthful revelation satisfies the necessary 
first-order conditions: that is,  W i(θ; θ) = 0 . Furthermore, the second order deriv-
ative is
(B4)   ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i (m; θ) =  
∂ W i ____∂ m i (m; θ) 
  =  ( (  ∂ 2  v i  ____ ∂ 2 x (d (m) , θ) −   ∂ 
2  v i  ____ ∂ 2 x (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) −   ∂ 
2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d (m) , m) )  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) 
 +  ( ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , θ) −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , m) )   ∂ 
2 d ____ ∂ 2  θ i  (m) , 
which at  m = θ simplifies to
  
 ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i (θ; θ) = − 
 ∂ 2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d (θ) , θ)  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (θ) . 
Under the single crossing condition as in Assumption 1,  
 ∂ 2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d (θ) , θ) > 0 , hence the necessary second-order conditions for a local maximum are satisfied only 
if  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) ≥ 0 .
If  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly EPIC, then  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) ≥ 0 must hold for all  i and  θ i . However, 
 ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) = 0 can only hold for isolated points. To show this, consider that 
 ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( s i ,  θ −i ) = 0 for some interval  s i ∈  ( θ i ,  θ i + ε) , where  ε > 0 . Then, the 
FOC  W i(θ; θ) =  W i( s i ,  θ −i ; θ) = 0 and all  s i ∈  ( θ i ,  θ i + ε) ensure the same utility 
as reporting the true type  θ i , which contradicts strict EPIC. Hence,  d can not be con-
stant on an interval, therefore  d is strictly increasing in all  θ i .
In the other direction, if  d is strictly increasing, a report  m i can satisfy the FOC 
given  θ i and  m −i =  θ −i ,  W i( m i ,  θ −i ; θ) = 0 , if either term in (B3) is  0 . By the sin-
gle crossing condition, the first term is  0 if and only if  m i =  θ i . The second term 
can be  0 for some  m i ≠  θ i if  ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( m i ,  θ −i ) = 0 . Hence, the FOC for  i ’s optimization 
problem, when the state is  θ and the opponents report truthfully, can only be satisfied 
by (i)  m i =  θ i and by (ii)  m i ≠  θ i such that  ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( m i ,  θ −i ) = 0 . We show next that 
only the first case satisfies the second-order conditions for a local optimum.
Case (i): Consider  m i =  θ i . Then, either   ∂ 2 U i ____ ∂ 2  m i  (θ; θ) < 0 (which implies that 
truthful revelation is a strict local optimum), or  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) = 0 . But since  d is strictly 
increasing, it may have a zero derivative only at an isolated point. Hence, there 
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exists a neighborhood around  θ i such that for all  s i ≠  θ i in this neighborhood, 
 ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( s i ,  θ −i ) > 0 . This in turn implies that  U i(  · ,  θ −i ; θ) is strictly concave around  θ i , 
and hence truthful revelation is a strict local optimum.
Case (ii): Suppose that  m i ≠  θ i is such that  ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( m i ,  θ −i ) = 0 . Then, by (B4), 
 
 ∂ 2  U i  ____ ∂ 2  m i  ( m i ,  θ −i ; θ) =  ( 
∂ v i  ___∂ x  (d ( m i ,  θ −i ) , θ) −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x  (d ( m i ,  θ −i ) ,  m i ,  θ −i ) )   ∂ 2 d ___ ∂ 2  θ i  ( m i ,  θ −i ) . 
By the single crossing condition, the term in parentheses has the same sign around  m i 
in a neighborhood away from  θ i . If  ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( m i ,  θ −i ) = 0 , the differentiability and strict 
monotonicity of  d implies that  d switches convexity at  m i , and its second-order 
derivative is negative to the left of  m i , and positive to the right of  m i . It follows that 
 
 ∂ 2  U i ____ ∂ 2  m i ( · ,  θ −i ; θ) switches sign at  m i , and hence  m i ≠  θ i is not optimal if 
 ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( m i ,  θ −i ) = 0 .
Given that the FOC for an interior optimum can only be satisfied at (i) and (ii), 
to show that (i) is the global optimum, it suffices to show that the end points  θ _ i 
and  
_ θi are not optimal for interior types. The single crossing condition and the strict 
monotonicity of  d imply that the right-derivative of  W i( θ _ i ,  θ −i ; θ) is positive, thus  θ _ i 
is not optimal, and that the left-derivative of  W i ( _ θi ,  θ −i ; θ) is negative, thus  _ θi is not 
optimal. Strict EPIC follows.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
By Lemma 2, in SCC-environments the canonical direct mechanism is strictly 
ex post incentive compatible, and if  
∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) < 0 , it also satisfies the strict con-
cavity condition of Theorem 1 for   =   BF . The result then follows directly from 
Corollary 1. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Step 1: Note that in SCC-PC-environments, for any  i and  j , we have 
that  
∂ W i ___∂ m j (m; θ) = −  ∂ 
2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m)  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (m) and in particular  ∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) < 0 for all 
m, θ . For  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 defined as in (13), the independent common prior implies 
that, for  f ˆ i ( θ i ) ≔ E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) , we have  f ˆ i ′( θ i ) = 0 for all  θ i . Hence, Condition 1 
of Theorem 2 holds.
Step 2: By construction,  
∂ W i ___∂ m j (m; θ) = − ∂ L 
ˆ
i  ___∂ m j  . Hence, the RHS of Condition 2 
of Theorem 2 is  0 for all  θ i , and hence smaller than the LHS (which therefore sat-
isfies Condition 2). Since both conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied, the transfers 
in (14) ensure full implementation. Moreover,  ∂ W i ___∂ m j (m; θ) = − ∂ L 
ˆ
i  ___∂ m j  also ensures that 
i ’s expected payoffs in the modified mechanism, and hence the set of best replies, 
are constant in  m j for all  j ≠ i . But since  θ i is the unique best reply to all con-
jectures that assign probability one to others’ truthful reports, it also follows that 
 R  θ i  , 1 =  { θ i } for all  θ i and  i . Hence, full implementation is achieved in dominant 
strategies.  ∎ 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
As noted in the previous proof, we have that  
∂ W i ___∂ m j (m; θ)  =  −  ∂ 
2  v i  ____∂ x ∂ θ j  (d (m) , m)  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (m) 
for all  i and  j in SCC-PC-environments. For  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 defined as in (13), 
and  f ˆ i ( θ i ) ≔ E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) , Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) implies that, 
if valuations are supermodular, then   f ˆ i ′( θ i ) ≥ 0 for all  θ i . Since, by the assumptions 
of SCC-environments  
∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) < 0 , it follows that  ∂ W i ___∂ m i (m; θ) −  f i ′( m i ) < 0 for all 
m, θ , which implies that Condition 1 of Theorem 2 holds. The rest is identical to 
Step-2 of the proof of Proposition 3. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
If  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly EPIC, then  d is strictly increasing (by Lemma 2) and   -DS 
implementability follows from Propositions 3 and 4. For the other direction, if  d 
is   -DS implementable, then there exist transfers  t DS that guarantee that truthful 
revelation is the only interim best response, regardless of the opponents’ strategies. 
Hence, for all  θ i ,
  { θ i } =  arg max  θ i ′∈ M i 
   ∫  Θ −i  
 
  U i( θ i ′,  m −i ;  θ i ,  θ −i ) d b  θ i   for all   m −i , 
where  b  θ i  is such that  B  θ i  =  { b  θ i  } from the common prior assumption. The neces-
sary condition for this best response is that for all  i , for all  θ i , and for all  m −i ∈  M −i ,
  ( ∫  Θ −i  
 
 ( ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d (m) , θ) ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  (m) ) d b  θ i  +  ∂ t i 
DS  ____∂ m i  ( m i ,  m −i ) )  |   m i = θ i  = 0,  hence 
   
∂ t i DS  ____∂ m i  ( θ i ,  m −i ) = − ∫  Θ −i  
 
  ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d ( θ i ,  m −i ) ,  θ i ,  θ −i ) d b  θ i  ·  ∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( θ i ,  m −i ) . 
Using this property of the transfers, the second order partial derivative of the interim 
payoffs is the expected value of (B4), which by Assumption 2 at  m i =  θ i simplifies 
to
  ∫  Θ −i  
 
   ∂ 2  U i _____ ∂ 2  m i ( θ i ,  m −i ; θ) d b  θ i  = − 
∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( θ i ,  m −i ) ·  ∫  Θ −i  
 
 (  ∂ 2  v i  _____∂ x ∂ θ i  (d ( θ i ,  m −i ) ,  θ i ,  m −i ) ) d b  θ i  . 
By the single crossing condition in Assumption 1, the second-order conditions are 
satisfied only if  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (m) ≥ 0 . However,  ∂ d ___∂ θ i (θ) = 0 can only hold for isolated points, 
and so  d must be strictly increasing. To show this, suppose (by means of contradic-
tion) that there exists  θ i and  ε > 0 and some  s −i such that  ∂ d ___∂ θ i ( s i ,  s −i ) = 0 for all 
 s i ∈  ( θ i ,  θ i + ε) , which also implies for  W i (as given by (B3)) that 
W i( s i ,  s −i ; θ) = 0 for all  s i ∈  ( θ i ,  θ i + ε) . Thus, for the FOC, 
 ∫  Θ −i   W i( θ i ,  s −i ; θ) d b  θ i  =  ∫  Θ −i   W i( s i ,  s −i ; θ) d b  θ i  = 0 for all  s i ∈  ( θ i ,  θ i + ε) , in other 
words, any such  s i ensures the same expected payoff as reporting the true type  θ i , 
hence contradicting   -DS implementation. Hence,  d is strictly increasing for all  θ i 
and hence  (d,  t ∗ ) is strictly EPIC (by Lemma 2).  ∎ 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
For each  i, j , let  φ j|i :  Θ i →  Θ j be such that, for each  θ i ∈  Θ i ,  φ j|i ( θ i ) ≔ E ( θ j |  θ i ) . By assumption, the functions  φ j|i are differentiable. Then, the design-
er’s information is represented by belief restrictions   – =  ((  –  θ i  )  θ i ∈ Θ i  ) i∈I such that 
  –  θ i  =  {β ∈ Δ ( Θ −i )  :   E β ( θ j ) =  φ j|i ( θ i )  for all j ∈ I \ {i} } , for each  i ∈ I and 
 θ i ∈  Θ i . Next notice that, in SCC-PC-environments, the function  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 
defined in (13) is linear. Hence, if the conditional expectations  E ( θ j |  θ i ) are common 
knowledge in   – , so are the conditional expectations  E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) , which are thus 
moment conditions that can be used to weaken the strategic externalities. Formally, 
let  f ˆ i ( θ i ) ≔  L ˆi  ( ( φ j|i ( θ i ) ) j∈I \ {i}  ) . Then, because of the linearity of the  E ( · ) oper-
ator and of  L ˆi :  Θ −i → 핉 , we have that  E( L ˆi ( θ −i ) |  θ i ) =  f ˆ i ( θ i ) for all  i , that is ρ =  ( L ˆi ,  f ˆ i ) i∈I ∈ ϱ (  – ) . Moreover,  f ˆ i is nondecreasing if so are the functions  φ j|i . 
The result then follows from Theorem 2 for the same reasons as Proposition 4 does. 
∎ 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: 
Fix  i and  θ i . Let  l ≔  max k∈I   l k . By the definition of  t ρ , for any  μ ∈  C  θ i   , adding 
and subtracting  L  i ( θ −i ) , applying Leibniz’s rule and the triangle inequality, we have
(B5)  |  ∂ E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( θ i ) |  =   |  ∫  Θ −i × M −i    ( ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d ( θ i ,  m −i ) , θ) −  ∂ v i  ___∂ x (d ( θ i ,  m −i ) ,  θ i ,  m −i ) ) 
 ×   ∂ d ___∂ θ i  ( θ i ,  m −i ) +  L i ( m −i ) −  L i ( θ −i ) +  L i ( θ −i ) −  f i( θ i ) dμ |  
 ≤  ∫  Θ −i × M −i  
 
  ∑ 
j≠i
 |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j (θ;  θ i ,  s −i ) |  |  θ j −  m j | dμ + ε ≤ S E i ρ ( θ i ) · l + ε. 
For any  m i ∈  R i , 1 ( θ i ) , there exists  μ ∈  C  θ i   such that  m i ∈ B R  θ i  (μ) . 
Since  m i is best reply, it minimizes the first-order partial derivative. Using (B5) and 
by the concavity of the expected utility function, it follows that for all  μ ∈  C  θ i   , 
 |  ∂ E U  θ i  μ _____∂ m i  ( m i ) −  ∂ E U  θ i  μ _____∂ m i  ( θ i ) | ≤ S E i ρ ( θ i ) · l + ε . By the mean value theorem, there 
exists  s i ∈  M i such that  |  ( ∂ 2 E U  θ i  μ/ ∂ 2  m i )  ( s i ) |  | m i −  θ i | ≤ S E i ρ ( θ i ) · l + ε . 
Therefore, for all  θ i and  m i ∈  R i , 1 ( θ i ) ,
(B6)  |  m i −  θ i | ≤  S E i 
ρ ( θ i ) · l + ε  ____________ 
O C i ρ ( θ i )  . 
Then, for any  m i ∈  R i , 2 ( θ i ) , there exists  μ ∈  C  θ i   ∩  R i , 1 ( θ i ) such that  m i ∗ ∈ B R  θ i  ( μ ∗ ) . For the Taylor-expansion of  ∂ E U  θ i  μ/∂ m i at  θ i around  m i there 
exists  s i ∈  M i such that
  
∂ E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( θ i ) =  
∂ E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( m i ) +  
 ∂ 2 E U  θ i  μ ______ ∂ 2  m i  ( s i )  ( θ i −  m i ) . 
2275Ollár and Penta: Full ImPlementatIOn and BelIeF restrIctIOnsVOl. 107 nO. 8
Since  m i is best reply to  μ and  E U  θ i  μ( m i ) is strictly concave, we have that
(B7)  |  ∂ 2 E U  θ i  μ ______ ∂ 2  m i  ( s i ) |  | θ i −  m i | ≤  | ∂ E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( θ i ) | . 
Consider the RHS of (B7) and bound it similarly to (B5), by adding and subtract-
ing  L  i ( θ −i ) , applying Leibniz’s rule and the triangle inequality, to get
(B8)  |  ∂ E U  θ i  μ ______∂ m i  ( θ i ) | ≤  ∫  Θ −i × M −i     ∑ j≠i  |   ∂ 2  U i _______ ∂ m i ∂ m j (θ;  θ i ,  s −i ) |  |  θ j −  m j | dμ + ε. 
Let (h,  θ h ) ≔  arg max i∈I, θ i ∈ Θ i   SE i ρ ( θ i )/ OC i ρ ( θ i ) and  ˆ  SEρ ≔ S E h ρ( θ h ) ,  ˆ  OCρ 
≔ O C h ρ( θ h ) . Hence,  NS E ρ =   ˆ  SE
ρ  ___ ˆ  OCρ  . Combining (B7), (B8), and (B6), we get
  | θ i −  m i | ≤  S E i 
ρ ( θ i )  _______
O C i ρ ( θ i )   
 ˆ  SE · l + ε ________ ˆ  OCρ  +  ε _______ O C i ρ ( θ i ) 
for all  θ i and  m i ∈  R i , 2 ( θ i ) . By induction, at the  k th round, for all  θ i and  m i ∈  R i , k ( θ i ) ,
  |  θ i −  m i | ≤  ( S E i 
ρ ( θ i )  _______
O C i ρ ( θ i )  )  (NS E ρ ) k−1 · l +  ( S E i 
ρ ( θ i )  _______
O C i ρ ( θ i )  )  ∑ n=0
k−2
 (NS E ρ ) n 
 ×  ε ____  ˆ  OCρ +  ε _______ O C i ρ ( θ i ) .
Condition 2 in Theorem 2 guarantees that  NS E ρ < 1 and  S E i ρ ( θ i ) /O C i ρ ( θ i ) < 1 . 
Hence, taking limits as  k → ∞ and letting  O C ρ ≔  min i∈I,  θ i ∈ Θ i   O C i ρ ( θ i ) , for all  θ i 
and  m i ∈  R i  ( θ i ) :
   | θ i −  m i | ≤  S E i 
ρ ( θ i )  _______
O C i ρ ( θ i )   
1 _______ 
1 − NS E ρ  ε ____  ˆ  OCρ +  ε _______ O C i ρ ( θ i ) 
 ≤ NS E ρ  1 _______ 
1 − NS E ρ  ε ____ O C ρ +  ε ____ O C ρ =  1 _______ 1 − NS E ρ  ε ____ O C ρ . 
Hence, for all  i and  θ i ,  R i  ( θ i ) ⊆  [ θ i ± ε/ ( (1 − NS E ρ ) O C ρ ) ] .  ∎ 
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